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STATE-ACTION IMMUNITY AND SECTION 5
OF THE FTC ACT
Daniel A. Crane* & Adam Hester**
The state-action immunity doctrine of Parker v. Brown immunizes anticom-
petitive state regulations from preemption by federal antitrust law so long as
the state takes conspicuous ownership of its anticompetitive policy. In its 1943
Parker decision, the Supreme Court justified this doctrine, observing that no
evidence of a congressional will to preempt state law appears in the Sherman
Act’s legislative history or context. In addition, commentators generally as-
sume that the New Deal court was anxious to avoid re-entangling the federal
judiciary in Lochner-style substantive due process analysis. The Supreme
Court has observed, without deciding, that the Federal Trade Commission
might not be bound by the Parker doctrine but instead enjoys “superior pre-
emption” authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act. Drawing on the FTC
Act’s legislative history and its institutional distinctiveness from Sherman Act
enforcement, this Article makes an affirmative case for FTC super-preemption
power over anticompetitive state laws
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Introduction
Commercial regulations by state and local governments teem with re-
strictions on competition. Well-known examples include restrictive occupa-
tional licensing rules,1 cartel-like limitations on transportation-service
providers,2 product-distribution rules limiting competition against automo-
bile retailers,3 restrictions on sharing services like Airbnb,4 and municipal
prohibitions on street-food vendors.5 Often, these restrictions result from
economic interest-group parochialism and asymmetries between the con-
centrated interests of incumbent producers and the diffuse interests of con-
sumers.6 The results can be pernicious. Anticompetitive regulatory
restrictions raise prices to consumers and create barriers to entry and
innovation.
The federal government is hardly immune from interest-group capture
of its own, but it plays a limited role in policing the worst excesses of paro-
chial state legislation. Three federal legal doctrines—two constitutional and
one statutory—place some degree of constraint on anticompetitive state leg-
islation.7 State regulations may be unconstitutional under the dormant, or
negative, commerce clause if they unjustifiably discriminate against out-of-
1. See Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupa-
tions Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1093, 1102–10 (2014).
2. Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. Dialogue 85, 87–88
(2015), https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Dialogue/
Rogers_Dialogue.pdf [https://perma.cc/53EJ-KWWT] (discussing regulations of Uber’s Wash-
ington, D.C. operations).
3. See Daniel A. Crane, Tesla, Dealer Franchise Laws, and the Politics of Crony Capital-
ism, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 573, 574–75 (2016) [hereinafter Crane, Tesla].
4. Roberta A. Kaplan & Michael L. Nadler, Airbnb: A Case Study in Occupancy Regula-
tion and Taxation, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. Dialogue 103, 109–12 (2015), https://lawreview.uchica
go.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Dialogue/Kaplan_Nadler_Dialogue.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5XLG-6SB7].
5. E.g., Beth Kregor, Food Trucks, Incremental Innovation, and Regulatory Ruts, 82 U.
Chi. L. Rev. Dialogue 1, 7–10 (2015), https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchica
go.edu/files/uploads/Dialogue/Kregor_Dialogue.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7HU-WYUC]; Na-
tional Street Vending Initiative, Inst. for Just., http://ij.org/issues/economic-liberty/vending/
[https://perma.cc/Q6MN-Y6W6].
6. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (3d ed. 2012)
(describing social choice and outlining Arrow’s Theorem); James M. Buchanan & Gordon
Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democ-
racy (1962) (explaining public choice theory and how the public interest can be upset by
strength of preference for a given choice); Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of De-
mocracy (1957) (describing an economic theory of decisionmaking that focuses on political
and community ideology); Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (2d ed. 1971)
(arguing that free riding will result in overrepresentation of concentrated, minority interests
and underrepresentation of diffuse, majority interests).
7. Other federal constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provisions may also impose
constraints on state regulation in particular ways. For example, the First Amendment’s com-
mercial speech doctrine may sometimes constrain state restrictions on advertising or other
aspects of competition. See Note, Dissent, Corporate Cartels, and the Commercial Speech Doc-
trine, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1892, 1908–11 (2007).
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state commerce or burden commerce without legitimate justification.8 State
restrictions may fail rational basis review under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s equal protection clause if they have no objective basis other than to
erect competitive barriers to protect economic special interests.9 And, finally,
under some circumstances, state regulations that delegate the power to re-
strict competition to nonstate actors must yield to the Sherman Act’s pro-
competition policy.10
Although federal law imposes some restraint on anticompetitive state
and local regulation, its touch is relatively light and deferential. All three of
the doctrines just discussed received a strong and lasting imprint of post-
Lochner gun-shyness during the New Deal era, as the Supreme Court re-
treated from a period of perceived excess in federal judicial oversight of state
socioeconomic regulation.11 In the post-New Deal order, the three doctrines
aligned to allow only modest federal inquiry into anticompetitive state and
local restrictions, allowing many of the most parochial schemes to escape
searching federal scrutiny.
This Article addresses the statutory prong—federal antitrust preemp-
tion of state law—in the wider context of constitutional and institutional
history. In particular, it examines the assumed, but never decided, position
that the United States Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) lacks any preemp-
tive power over anticompetitive state and local regulations, apart from the
relatively light preemptive reach of the Sherman Act. It asserts, to the con-
trary, that the best historically informed and institutionally sound reading of
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act suggests that the FTC should
8. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137, 142 (1970). See generally 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-5,
at 1050–52 (3d ed. 2000).
9. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 222–23 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[N]either prece-
dent nor broader principles suggest that mere economic protection of a particular industry is a
legitimate governmental purpose . . . .”); Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 991 n.15 (9th
Cir. 2008) (“[M]ere economic protectionism for the sake of economic protectionism is irra-
tional with respect to determining if a classification survives rational basis review.”);
Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[P]rotecting a discrete interest group
from economic competition is not a legitimate governmental purpose.”). But see Sensational
Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 2015) (rejecting precedent from other Cir-
cuits holding that pure economic protectionism lacks a rational basis); Powers v. Harris, 379
F.3d 1208, 1221 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[A]bsent a violation of a specific constitutional provision
or other federal law, intrastate economic protectionism constitutes a legitimate state
interest.”).
10. See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1117 (2015)
(holding that North Carolina Dental Board’s restriction on teeth-whitening services violated
the Sherman Act).
11. See Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Politi-
cal Process, 96 Yale L.J. 486, 499–500 (1987) (“Having only just determined not to use the
Constitution in that manner, the Court was not about to resurrect Lochner in the garb of the
Sherman Act.”); Paul R. Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker
v. Brown, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 328, 331–34 (1975) (explaining the Court’s decision in Parker
through the lens of anti-Lochner sentiment).
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enjoy what the Supreme Court has hypothesized as “superior preemption
authority” over state and local regulations that unduly restrict competition.12
As a matter of legal doctrine, the question of the FTC’s preemptive au-
thority originates in the Supreme Court’s seminal 1943 decision in Parker v.
Brown.13 In Parker, the Court held that “[t]here is no suggestion of a pur-
pose to restrain state action in the [Sherman] Act’s legislative history.”14 The
resulting state-action immunity doctrine sharply limited any preemptive
scope of the Sherman Act over anticompetitive state regulations.15 Parker
also rejected a dormant commerce clause challenge to the state regulation at
issue.16 The case thus showcased the Court’s uniform reluctance to permit
any strand of federal law—constitutional or statutory—to revive
Lochnerism.
Neither Parker nor its progeny squarely addressed whether antitrust en-
forcement by the FTC should be bound by the same constraints. While occa-
sionally asserting the possibility of a more preemptive scope of action,17 the
FTC has historically acquiesced in litigating state-action issues under the
doctrinal framework established in Parker and its progeny.18 In recent years,
however, the FTC has shown renewed interest in challenging or otherwise
discouraging the adoption of anticompetitive state or local regulations. It has
succeeded in some cases, but the Parker doctrine keeps the FTC hamstrung
from mounting a more robust set of challenges.
A reexamination of the FTC Act’s context and history, as well as the
commission’s institutional distinctiveness, suggests that the Parker doctrine
is misapplied to the FTC. Although federal preemption was not squarely
addressed in the statute, important themes concerning the FTC’s relation-
ship to the Interstate Commerce Commission and state corporation law set a
very different stage for the FTC Act than had been in existence two and a
half decades earlier, prior to the Sherman Act. And, from the perspective of
institutional design, the FTC shares few of the attributes of Sherman Act
enforcement that lead to concerns about excessive federal judicial control
over state economic regulation.19 In short, despite decades of acquiescence,
the case for application of the Parker doctrine to the FTC is weaker than
generally assumed, and the benefits of not applying it are potentially strong.
An FTC with greater preemptive power over state regulation could play a
12. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 635 (1992).
13. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
14. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351.
15. See Milton Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 1,
6–8 (1972).
16. Parker, 317 U.S. at 368.
17. See infra notes 77–81 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 110–12 (2015);
FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 635 (1992) (“We need not determine whether the
antitrust statutes can be distinguished on this basis [i.e., whether Parker applies only to the
Sherman Act but not FTC enforcement under section 5 of the FTC Act], because the Commis-
sion does not assert any superior pre-emption authority in the instant matter.”).
19. See infra Sections III.A & III.B.
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salutary role in policing nakedly or inconsiderately anticompetitive state reg-
ulations, and thereby promote good government, innovation, and consumer
welfare.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I introduces the
Parker state-action immunity doctrine in its historical context. It frames the
doctrine as an offshoot of anti-Lochner reaction, doctrinally homogenized
during the New Deal with the retreating “negative” Commerce Clause and
equal protection and substantive due process doctrines as applied to socio-
economic regulation. It briefly surveys the emergence of a Parker state-ac-
tion doctrine oriented toward the political process and reflects on its failure
to check rampant anticompetitive regulation by state and local governments.
Finally, Part I diagnoses the causes and consequences of the Federal Trade
Commission’s acquiescence in the application of the Parker doctrine to FTC
enforcement.
Part II advances an argument based on historical context and legislative
history against application of the Parker doctrine to the FTC. In particular, it
draws on two distinctive background facets of the FTC’s legislative history to
show that, unlike the Sherman Act of 1890, the FTC Act of 1914 evidences a
congressional concern with anticompetitive state regulation. First, the FTC
Act emerged from a Progressive Era reaction to weaknesses in state corpora-
tion law and proposals for a preemptive federal incorporation regime. Al-
though Congress ultimately rejected the federal incorporation model, it did
so in the belief that the creation of a new federal commission could solve the
problems created by state facilitation of anticompetitive behavior that had
occurred in the previous decades through the race to the bottom in state
corporate law. Second, the FTC Act’s legislative history evidences a congres-
sional belief that the FTC would have powers akin to that of the Interstate
Commerce Commission.20 Shortly before the Senate took up the FTC Act,
the Supreme Court handed down its landmark decision in the Shreveport
Rate Case, holding that the ICC enjoyed preemptive power over inconsistent
state regulations.21 The Shreveport Rate Case was highly salient at the time of
the FTC Act’s passage and was discussed—implicitly, if not explicitly—in
the legislative history by both skeptics and proponents of the bill.22 Hence,
congressional references to the FTC as a generalist ICC for competition
should be understood to imply a congressional understanding that the FTC
would enjoy preemptive powers over state regulations that might facilitate
anticompetitive behavior.
Part III articulates institutionally grounded reasons for reading Section
5 of the FTC Act as more preemptive than the Sherman Act—or “superior
preempt[ive],”23 in the Supreme Court’s words. Unlike the Sherman Act,
which is privately enforceable, the FTC Act is enforceable only by the FTC,
20. See infra Section II.A.
21. Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States (The Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342,
358–59 (1914).
22. See infra Section II.B.2.
23. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. at 635.
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and it entails no criminal liability, damages, or penalties. Further, allowing
the FTC preemptive power raises fewer concerns about federal judges sec-
ond-guessing the wisdom of state regulations than would arise under the
Sherman Act. The FTC has economic expertise and institutional resources to
analyze complex economic trade-off decisions, which the federal courts may
lack.
Part IV provides a brief sketch of a world in which the FTC enjoyed
superior-preemptive power under the unfair-methods-of-competition prong
of Section 5 of the FTC Act. In particular, it provides some framing thoughts
on the sorts of tests the commission might use to distinguish between per-
missible and anticompetitive state regulations.
I. The Parker Regime and the FTC
A. Parker in the Shadow of Lochner
Parker v. Brown involved a challenge by a California raisin farmer
against an agricultural proration scheme established by the California Agri-
cultural Prorate Act.24 Under the Act, any group of ten California farmers
could apply for the establishment of a prorate marketing plan for any crop
grown in the state.25 In 1940, a program committee constituted under the
statute approved a seasonal proration marketing program for raisins.26 The
program required all raisin farmers to bring their crop to receiving stations,
where the raisins were classified by quality; all substandard raisins, and at
least 20 percent of the standard and substandard raisins, were placed into a
“surplus pool” and effectively removed from the market.27 Fifty percent of
the crop was to be placed in a “stabilization pool,” which the committee
could market or withhold at its discretion in order to increase market
prices.28 The system amounted to, in effect, a mandatory, government-run
raisin cartel.
Porter Brown, the gadfly farmer, argued that the program violated the
Sherman Act and the negative commerce clause.29 In an opinion by Chief
Justice Stone, the Court rejected both arguments.30 As to the antitrust claim,
it acknowledged that the underlying cartel arrangement would have been
illegal if privately arranged.31 The Court also assumed, without deciding,
that Congress could have made the Sherman Act preemptive of inconsistent
24. 317 U.S. 341, 344 (1943).
25. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 346.
26. See id. at 347.
27. Id. at 348.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 348–49.
30. Id. at 352, 368.
31. Id. at 350 (“We may assume for present purposes that the California prorate program
would violate the Sherman Act if it were organized and made effective solely by virtue of a
contract, combination or conspiracy of private persons, individual or corporate.”).
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state legislation if it so chose.32 The Court nonetheless rejected Parker’s chal-
lenge on statutory interpretation grounds. Finding “nothing in the language
of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to
restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legisla-
ture” and “no suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action in the Act’s
legislative history,”33 but only a concern with purely private monopoly, the
Court found that the Sherman Act did not preempt state regulation.34
The Court similarly rejected Parker’s negative Commerce Clause chal-
lenge. Although noting that between 90 and 95 percent of the California
raisin crop was ultimately sold outside of the state,35 the court observed that
the directly regulated activity—production and marketing of raisins in the
state—was intrastate activity.36 Since “the regulation [was] imposed before
any operation of interstate commerce occur[red],” the State of California
was not unconstitutionally attempting to regulate interstate commerce.37
In its immediate political and historical context, Parker reflects the Su-
preme Court’s retreat from the economic substantive due process regime
associated with Lochner v. New York38 during the decades following the os-
tensible “switch in time that saved nine” of the mid-1930s.39 The New Deal
Court had pivoted dramatically from the Court’s earlier substantive scrutiny
of state legislation that interfered with business freedom, and it announced
that it would defer to state legislative judgments on economic regulation.40
Having recently abandoned an anti-regulatory agenda under the Due Pro-
cess Clause, the Parker Court was reluctant to permit anti-regulatory chal-
lenges under other legal theories—whether antitrust or the Commerce
Clause—to draw the federal courts back into substantive review of state eco-
nomic regulations.41 Stone, the author of the Parker decision, also authored
32. Id.
33. Id. at 350–51.
34. See id. at 350–52.
35. Id. at 359.
36. Id. at 361–63.
37. Id. at 361.
38. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
39. See generally Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court (1998) (critically
assessing conventional wisdom of a politically motivated switch in time in 1937 and arguing
instead for an evolution of the legal doctrine starting earlier than 1937).
40. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397–400 (1937) (upholding a state
statute regulating the hours and working conditions of women against a due process chal-
lenge); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537–39 (1934) (upholding a New York price-fixing
statute against a substantive due process challenge).
41. Parker links the New Deal cases like Nebbia and West Coast Hotel with subsequent
due process and equal protection challenges to economic regulation. See, e.g., Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730–32 (1963) (rejecting a due process challenge to a Kansas statute
limiting debt adjusting to lawyers); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487–91
(1955) (holding that an Oklahoma statute regulating opticians did not violate the due process
clause).
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the Supreme Court’s landmark United States v. Carolene Products Co.42 deci-
sion, which, in a famous footnote, suggested a regime of bifurcated constitu-
tional scrutiny in which the Court would defer to legislative judgments on
economic matters, but closely scrutinize state action marred by democratic
failures or which impaired the rights of “discrete and insular minorities.”43
Parker kept company with a cluster of other decisions in the Stone Court
that effectuated the Carolene Products vision, shifting constitutional juris-
prudence away from protecting corporate and individual economic rights
and toward protecting social and political rights.44
That Parker reflects an anti-Lochnerian judgment remains a fixed inter-
pretive point in judicial and scholarly discussions of state-action immunity
from the operation of the federal antitrust laws. For example, in a concur-
ring opinion in a leading state-action immunity decision,45 Justice Stevens
expressed concern that a form of antitrust analysis that required courts to
balance the community benefits of state and local laws against their an-
ticompetitive effects would require courts to “engage in the same wide-rang-
ing, essentially standardless inquiry into the reasonableness of local
regulation that th[e] Court [ ] properly rejected” in terminating Lochner-
ism.46 Similarly, in upholding a Massachusetts retail-liquor-license statute
against a claim of Sherman Act preemption, the First Circuit observed that
42. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
43. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. Owen Fiss described Carolene Products’ footnote
four as “[t]he great and modern charter for ordering the relations between judges and other
agencies of government . . . .” Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The
Forms of Justice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1979); see also Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products
Revisited, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1087, 1087 n.4 (1982) (collecting scholarship describing the im-
portance to constitutional jurisprudence of footnote four).
44. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), abrogated by Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), held that the First Amendment
does not render unconstitutional a statute prohibiting the distribution of commercial advertis-
ing in public places. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945), held that the
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause did not require compensation when the United States built
an upstream dam on a river, which reduced the water flow to a power company’s downstream
dam. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), the Court found that an Arizona
train-length law was not preempted by the Interstate Commerce Act or the negative Com-
merce Clause. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), dramatically expanded the reach of the
federal Commerce Clause power. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), struck down laws
requiring the compulsory sterilization of criminals as a violation of the equal protection
clause. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), struck down a licensing fee for door-to-
door solicitations on First Amendment grounds. West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), invalidated the requirement that all students salute the Ameri-
can flag on First Amendment grounds. Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944), held
that sellers of religious materials could not be subject to the same taxes as sellers of commer-
cial materials. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), abrogated by Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551 (1972), held that the First Amendment applied to speech restrictions by a privately
owned company town. Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946), invalidated the ordinance prohib-
iting the distribution of religious materials.
45. Cmty. Commc’ns. Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 58 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
46. Id. at 67.
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“[t]o allow federal judges to decide which of these legislative enactments
should survive and which should be condemned comes close to reintroduc-
ing the kind of judgments that got the Supreme Court into so much trouble
in the Lochner era.”47 The court acknowledged that more intensive judicial
scrutiny of state legislation under the Sherman Act “might well [result in]
more competition and greater consumer welfare,” but feared that such im-
provements “would come at the cost of second-guessing the democratically
elected legislature’s decisions about the proper balance between competition
and other social policies that are commonly reflected in such legislation.”48
Scholars routinely discuss Parker and its progeny as embodiments of anti-
Lochner sentiment.49
B. The Midcal Test and Representation Reinforcement
Although the language of the Parker opinion suggested a categorical re-
jection of federal antitrust preemption of state regulation, the Parker state-
action immunity doctrine that subsequently developed allowed room for
federal preemption. The Supreme Court eventually settled on a two-part test
for Parker immunity, which it articulated in California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.50 Under this Midcal test, the anticompetitive
policy must be “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state pol-
icy” and actively supervised by agents of the state.51 Unless an anticompeti-
tive state statute meets these requirements, it is preempted by the Sherman
Act.
47. Mass. Food Ass’n v. Mass. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm’n, 197 F.3d 560, 565
(1st Cir. 1999).
48. Id.
49. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also James C. Cooper & William E.
Kovacic, U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public Re-
straints on Competition, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1555, 1570 (2010) (“Parker then can be seen as a
necessary concession to anticompetitive state regulation to avoid a return to the Lochner era
. . . . Once the federal judiciary got out of the business of second-guessing the wisdom of
states’ economic regulation under substantive due process analysis, it could hardly reopen this
line of attack under the guise of antitrust. Parker prevented this outcome.”); Thomas M. Jorde,
Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine: A Return to Deferential Economic Federalism, 75
Calif. L. Rev. 227, 230 n.20 (1987) (“The Court’s own unsatisfying experience with economic
due process during the Lochner era, just prior to Parker, no doubt increased the Court’s sensi-
tivity to the importance of independent state economic choices.”); William H. Page, Interest
Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the Economic Theory of Legislation,
1987 Duke L.J. 618, 624 [hereinafter Page, Interest Groups] (“Parker was decided largely on the
ground that the Court was unwilling to reenter the political mire of the Lochner era under the
guise of Sherman Act preemption analysis.”); William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the
Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal
Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. Rev. 1099, 1104 (1981).
50. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
51. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105 (1980).
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The instinct behind the Midcal test is grounded in a representation-
reinforcement perspective that resonates with Carolene Products’s constitu-
tional paradigm.52 If states wish to displace competition, they may do so, but
only in a way that creates political accountability. Citizens affected by the
potentially higher prices and reduced quality that attends the lessening of
competition must be able to easily trace the policy back to state politicians
and hold them accountable at election time. Should the citizenry fail to see
net gains from the exchange, state politicians will feel it at the polls. Compe-
tition between states for business assets, citizens, and interstate business mo-
bility should, over time, weed out bad regulations, while permitting those
regulations that serve the public interest to survive.53
This representation-reinforcement theory of antitrust federalism holds
up in only a modest subset of cases. The account works reasonably well as to
regulatory schemes that benefit local producers (or some subset of local pro-
ducers) at the expense of local consumers. Thus, for example, a zoning ordi-
nance that restricts billboard advertising in Columbia, South Carolina,
benefits the incumbent billboard company, harms its would-be rivals, and
imposes costs on Columbia residents who presumably have to pay more for
goods and services—whether because of the increased cost of advertising or
because of the decreased amount of information caused by the decrease in
advertising.54 The ordinance may also reduce obnoxious eyesores and crass
commercialism. Local voters and community activists will have to balance
the cost increases against the aesthetic benefits, all of which is the stuff of
ordinary politics.
But this political accountability story runs into at least three significant
obstacles in a wide swath of cases. First, it does not work well with anticom-
petitive regulations—the benefits of which are captured mostly by local pro-
ducers and the costs of which are externalized to consumers who cannot
vote in the jurisdiction that imposed the anticompetitive regulation. Parker
itself provides the quintessential example of this cost-externalization prob-
lem.55 As noted, at the time of Parker, half of the world’s raisins, and almost
all raisins sold in the United States, came from California.56 Further, more
than 90 percent of the raisins grown in California were shipped outside of
the state.57 Hence, California raisin producers were able to externalize the
costs of their cartel on consumers who could not vote on or directly influ-
ence electoral outcomes in the regulating jurisdiction. Indeed, many an-
ticompetitive schemes immunized from antitrust scrutiny under the Parker
52. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review
75–77 (1980).
53. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 343–44 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
54. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
55. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
56. Id. at 345.
57. Id.
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doctrine impose costs primarily on consumers who cannot vote in the rele-
vant jurisdiction.58
This cost-externalization objection to Midcal’s implicit representation-
reinforcement theory might be addressed by limiting Parker immunity to
circumstances where voters within the relevant jurisdiction internalize most
of the monopoly costs—a facet absent from the current state-immunity doc-
trine.59 But cost externalization is only one of three significant challenges to
the representation-reinforcement theory of state-action immunity. A second
one—alluded to at the outset of this Article—is the collective-action prob-
lem that arises from the asymmetry between the concentrated benefit to
producers  and the diffuse harm to consumers that comes with a monop-
oly.60 Democratic constraints on anticompetitive regulation are unlikely to
be effective where the burden on millions of voters is relatively slight com-
pared to the concentrated benefit that befalls a small number of producers
willing to invest heavily in the political system to maintain their monopoly
position.
It is not difficult to locate evidence of systematic competitive distortions
arising from state regulations that favor a relatively small group of producers
and impose diffuse costs on a large group of consumers. Automobile retail-
ing is a prime example. State dealer-franchise statutes, in place since the
mid-twentieth century, dramatically restrict retail competition through a
hodgepodge of prohibitions on manufacturer-distribution decisions, includ-
ing direct sales to consumers, competitive spacing of dealer locations, termi-
nation of ineffective dealers, and competitive warranty-reimbursement
policies.61 Dealers spend heavily in state and local elections to maintain these
restrictions, and—until recently, at least—there has been relatively little in-
vestment of resources by consumer groups to mount political challenges.62
These laws are probably impervious to antitrust challenge under the current
58. See Daniel A. Crane, Judicial Review of Anticompetitive State Action: Two Models in
Comparative Perspective, 1 J. Antitrust Enforcement 418, 424–26 (2013).
59. Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action
Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75
Tex. L. Rev. 1203, 1207 (1997). Inman and Rubinfeld would ask:
1) Does a state regulation generate significant monopoly spillovers onto nonresidents?;
and 2) Was the state regulation decided without political participation of the affected
nonresidents as evidenced by the lack of interstate regulatory agreement? If the answer to
both questions is yes, then the state regulation fails the spillover test for economic effi-
ciency, and a Sherman Act review of the regulation is appropriate.
Id.
60. See, e.g., Garland, supra note 11; Page, Interest Groups, supra note 49; John Shepard
Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1986).
61. See Crane, Tesla, supra note 3, at 606–07; Francine Lafontaine & Fiona Scott Morton,
State Franchise Laws, Dealer Terminations, and the Auto Crisis, 24 J. Econ. Persp. 233, 242–46
(2010).
62. See Crane, Tesla, supra note 3, at 605.
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constraints of the Parker doctrine, since the prohibitions emanate directly
from state legislatures.63
And relying on overcharged consumers to mobilize to overturn an-
ticompetitive regulations poses other problems—namely, the fact that ex-
isting laws benefit from inertia. Many state regulatory schemes currently
being invoked to slow the competitive advent of new technologies were en-
acted many decades ago in very different economic and social circum-
stances.64 The dealer-protection statutes being asserted to thwart Tesla
Motors arose at a time when the market was dominated by the “Big Three”
Detroit automobile manufacturers, and franchisees were perhaps justifiably
concerned about unequal bargaining power and manufacturer exploita-
tion;65 the taxi cab regulations being asserted to limit competition from ride-
sharing and house-renting services arose long before internet-based trans-
acting alleviated consumer concerns over peak-load pricing, fare opacity,
universal service, and many other potential consumer risks.66
Even if not originally enacted for anticompetitive purposes, many state
regulations entrench incumbent technologies and firms and perpetuate en-
try barriers long after the original rationales for the regulations have died.67
But, since it is much more difficult to overturn a regulatory regime than to
protect it,68 challenges to the status quo face formidable political obstacles.
Incumbency and inertia thus amplify the already significant survival advan-
tages that anticompetitive regulatory schemes enjoy due to cost externaliza-
tion and the asymmetry between producer gains and consumer losses.
In sum, the representation-reinforcement theory of Parker immunity
fails, in important respects, to capture the dynamics of state anticompetitive
regulations. Anticompetitive regulatory schemes with few justifications other
than special-interest-group protection come into being and persist for
lengthy periods because of cost externalization, incentive asymmetries be-
tween producers and consumers, and incumbency advantages.
C. Does the Parker Regime Apply to the FTC?
Parker involved a federal antitrust challenge under the Sherman Act,
which is enforceable by the U.S. Justice Department and by private plain-
tiffs.69 It did not involve any consideration of whether a similar preemptive
limitation might apply to the Federal Trade Commission, an independent
federal agency that enforces a separate substantive statute—Section 5 of the
63. Id. at 602.
64. See Lafontaine & Morton, supra note 61, at 238–41.
65. Crane, Tesla, supra note 3, at 577–79.
66. See Rogers, supra note 2, at 87–89.
67. See Crane, Tesla, supra note 3, at 593–601 (arguing that original rationales for dealer-
ship regulations do not apply in the context of Tesla’s direct-distribution model).
68. See, e.g., McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory
Interpretation, 57 L. & Contemp. Probs. 3, 16–21 (1994) (describing impediments to over-
turning decisions).
69. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); see also 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012).
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Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits “[u]nfair methods of com-
petition.”70 As discussed in greater detail in Part III, a number of considera-
tions might compel the conclusion that the Court’s logic in Parker and its
progeny does not apply with equal force to the FTC. Nonetheless, despite
frequent FTC litigation over the Parker doctrine over many decades, that
legal issue remains undetermined.
Though undetermined, the issue has not gone unremarked. In FTC v.
Ticor Title Insurance Co., the Supreme Court briefly acknowledged that the
question of whether the FTC might have super-preemption authority be-
yond the preemptive reach of the Sherman Act remains an open question.71
The Court noted that the commission had, at other times, argued that state-
action immunity “does not apply to Commission action under § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act,”72 citing a 1975 staff report to the Commis-
sion on Prescription Drug Price Disclosures73 and a student note in the
Harvard Law Review.74 The Court also noted that the influential Areeda-
Turner treatise “has expressed its skepticism of this view.”75 The Court
found it unnecessary to determine whether state-action immunity applies to
challenges brought by the FTC, because “the Commission does not assert
any superior pre-emption authority in the instant matter.” Thus the Court
applied the generic Parker state-action immunity doctrine to the FTC’s
challenge.76
Only a few federal appellate decisions have addressed the super-preemp-
tion question, and all were decided prior to Ticor. Three circuits have con-
cluded that the FTC may possess something like superior preemptive
authority, although no decision to that effect would be binding today. In
pre-Parker dictum, the Eighth Circuit recognized that the FTCA constitu-
tionally vested the FTC with the power to blunt “[a]ny action by the state
Legislature or any decision of the state courts” which “strikes at” Congress’s
power to regulate interstate commerce.77 Post-Parker, the Fourth Circuit re-
jected the argument that business conduct that complies with a state’s law
prevents the FTC from regulating the conduct and “nullify[ing] a valid state
statute.”78 Although the court ultimately found no conflict between the state
law and the FTC’s ruling, the Fourth Circuit accepted preemption within the
70. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
71. 504 U.S. 621, 635 (1992).
72. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. at 635.
73. FTC Bureau of Consumer Prot., Prescription Drug Price Disclosures: Staff
Report to the Federal Trade Commission, chs. VI(B), (C) (1975).
74. Note, The State Action Exemption and Antitrust Enforcement Under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 715 (1976) [hereinafter State Action Exemption].
75. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. at 635 (citing 1 Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner,
Antitrust Law ¶ 218 (1978)).
76. Id.
77. Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. FTC, 13 F.2d 673, 684 (8th Cir. 1926).
78. Royal Oil Corp. v. FTC, 262 F.2d 741, 743 (4th Cir. 1959).
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FTC’s “general grant of authority,”79 in part by relying on the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the FTC’s jurisdiction in light of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act.80 The Seventh Circuit, citing the Fourth Circuit, reached the
same conclusion (although, again, in dictum).81
On the other hand, the D.C. Circuit has upheld the applicability of the
Parker defense in FTC enforcement actions after concluding that the FTC
lacked the power to preempt state laws.82 That court first questioned
whether the state-action doctrine applied to FTC enforcement and regula-
tion in 1980.83 A decade later, it vacated an FTC rule declaring “certain state-
imposed restrictions on the practice of optometry [to be] unfair acts or
practices.”84 The court concluded that “[a]n agency may not exercise author-
ity over States as sovereigns unless that authority has been unambiguously
granted to it,” so the lack of “explicit congressional authorization” in the
FTC Act and the Magnuson-Moss Amendments (which gave the FTC
rulemaking authority) meant the FTC had overstepped its boundaries.85
The academic analysis of the FTC’s preemptive authority is similarly
minimal, dated, and split. The author of the Harvard student note and Paul
Verkuil both tried—and failed—to find any indication that Congress in-
tended to grant preemptive authority to the FTC (at least prior to the pas-
sage of the Magnuson-Moss Act in 1975).86 Nonetheless, both concluded
79. Id.
80. Id.; see also FTC v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560, 562–63 (1958) (“An examination of
[the McCarran-Ferguson Act] and its legislative history establishes that the Act withdrew from
the Federal Trade Commission the authority to regulate respondents’ [insurance] advertising
practices in those States which are regulating those practices under their own laws.”). From
this, the Fourth Circuit apparently concluded that the FTC could regulate noninsurance adver-
tising practices (or any business practice), even when a state is also regulating that conduct.
Royal Oil, 262 F.2d at 743.
81. See Peerless Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 284 F.2d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 1960) (“A local ordinance
cannot here circumscribe the plenary power granted to the Commission to police unfair and
deceptive practices in interstate commerce.”).
82. See Cal. State Bd. of Optometry v. FTC, 910 F.2d 976, 980–82 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
83. See Am. Optometric Ass’n v. FTC, 626 F.2d 896, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“[T]he Com-
mission’s proposed pre-emption of state law is almost as thorough as human ingenuity could
make it. Consequently, the Commission has at least approached the outer boundaries of its
authority and may have infringed on that deference to the states’ exercise of their police pow-
ers dictated by the principles of federalism. The rule therefore raises several interrelated issues:
Did Congress authorize the Commission to pre-empt state laws? If so, did the scope of the
Commission’s delegated power permit it to pre-empt state laws to the extent of pre-empting
the whole field of ophthalmic advertising? Does the state-action doctrine of Parker v. Brown
forbid the agency to issue this rule? Has the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction in treating
the states as persons under the Magnuson-Moss Act?” (citation omitted)).
84. Cal. State Bd. of Optometry, 910 F.2d at 979, 982.
85. Id. at 982. Contra Peerless Prods., Inc., 284 F.2d at 827 (“Unless Congress specifically
withdraws authority in particular areas, the Commission, upon its general grant of authority
under [the FTC Act], can restrain unfair business practices in interstate commerce even if the
activities or industries have been the subject of legislation by a state or even if the intrastate
conduct is authorized by state law.”).
86. See Paul R. Verkuil, Preemption of State Law by the Federal Trade Commission, 1976
Duke L.J. 225, 234–35; State Action Exemption, supra note 74, at 740–43.
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that Parker’s federalism concerns could be avoided where a careful FTC chal-
lenges anticompetitive state laws. The student note—focusing more on the
institutional competence of the commission—recognized that the commis-
sion can necessarily consider the public interest under Section 5 analysis,87
presumably in a neutral manner (as compared with the states88), more com-
petently than the courts,89 and with only limited remedies (i.e., preemption)
against the states.90 After finding preemptive intent in the 1975 amendments
to the FTC Act, Verkuil proposed several restraints on FTC preemptive con-
duct to limit “injury . . . to federal-state relations,”91 including heightened
judicial scrutiny, categorical limits on the types of “vital” state laws exposed
to FTC regulation,92 and the FTC’s own “standard of self-restraint.”93
Conversely, the Areeda treatise has consistently rejected the FTC as pos-
sessing the power of “superior-preemption.”94 Reviewing the same 1975
amendments as did the student note and Verkuil, the treatise rejects the
“far-from-certain” reading of the amended rulemaking provisions as “em-
power[ing] the FTC to supersede virtually the entire corpus of state eco-
nomic regulation.”95 Furthermore, while arguments based on the
commission’s sanctions and composition (i.e., those raised in the student
note) “reduce the sting of preempting state law,” Areeda and Turner  found
87. State Action Exemption, supra note 74, at 733–34 (“The very breadth of the concept
of an ‘unfair’ practice ensures that the Commission would have discretion to defer to noncom-
petitive modes of state regulation where important social purposes outweigh the value of free
competition.”); see also FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) (“[T]he
Federal Trade Commission does not arrogate excessive power to itself if, in measuring a prac-
tice against the elusive, but congressionally mandated standard of fairness, it, like a court of
equity, considers public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in
the spirit of the antitrust laws.”).
88. Parker is just one example of a state failing to internalize the effects of its anticompe-
titive regulation. See supra Section I.B.
89. See State Action Exemption, supra note 74, at 728–30.
90. See id. at 734–36.
91. Verkuil, supra note 86, at 247.
92. Id. at 243–47.
93. Id. at 243 (quoting FTC Bureau of Consumer Prot., supra note 73, at 74–192). For
other evaluations of the constraints limiting FTC preemption, see generally Robert G. Badal,
Restrictive State Laws and the Federal Trade Commission, 29 Admin. L. Rev. 239 (1977) (dis-
cussing the FTC’s authority and the limits on its power to preempt state requirements), and
John Hardin Young & Anthony F. Troy, Federal Trade Commission Preemption of State Regula-
tion: A Reevaluation, 12 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1248 (1978) (analyzing the FTC’s assertions that
self-imposed constraints will limit preemption issues).
94. See 1A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis
of Antitrust Principles and Their Application ¶ 231b2, 231c (4th ed. 2013); 1 Phillip
Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and
Their Application ¶ 218c (1st ed. 1978).
95. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 94, ¶ 218c. It appears, though, that the treatise did
not consider the amendments in light of the proposed, but rejected, amendments and other
legislative history, which explicitly discusses preemption. See Verkuil, supra note 86, at 235–40.
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(and Areeda and Hovenkamp still find) these arguments insufficient to
“overcome . . . the considerations of federalism” in Parker.96
It is no accident that the scholarship surrounding the FTC and preemp-
tion came entirely during the late 1970s. It was during this period that the
FTC showed interest in unleashing itself from Parker. In a 1975 staff report
on proposed prescription drug price-disclosure regulations, the FTC staff
concluded that the commission could “preempt state law in a particular area
simply by clearly expressing its intent to that effect,” even if “the state law is
not repugnant to any specific provision of the Trade Regulation Rule.”97 In
reaching that conclusion, the FTC argued that Parker’s limited statutory
holding98 does not apply to enforcement under Section 5.99
Since the D.C. Circuit’s 1990 California State Board of Optometry100
opinion, the FTC has not challenged Parker’s applicability in Section 5 ac-
tions. In establishing a “State Action Task Force,” whose 2003 report recom-
mended “clarification and re-affirmation of the original purposes of the
state action doctrine,”101 the FTC now seems content to allow Parker chal-
lenges to its investigative and enforcement actions.
For the most part, the FTC has not asserted superior-preemptive au-
thority or regularly contested Parker’s applicability during enforcement and
investigative actions, but has instead focused on pushing the boundaries of
the Parker doctrine in a more precompetitive direction. At least in recent
decades, much of the explanation for this acquiescence may lie in the
agency’s reluctance to differentiate itself from the Justice Department’s Anti-
trust Division for political reasons. In particular, from the early 1980s until
recently, the FTC largely acquiesced in the view that the substantive reach of
Section 5 of the FTC Act was effectively identical to the substantive reach of
the Sherman Act.102 Although the Supreme Court has held that Section 5 has
a broader prophylactic reach than the Sherman Act,103 the FTC lost a series
of Section 5 cases in the late 1970s and early 1980s,104 at the same time the
96. See Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 94, ¶ 231b2; Areeda & Turner, supra note
94, ¶ 218c.
97. FTC Bureau of Consumer Prot., supra note 73, at ch. VI(B).
98. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
99. FTC Bureau of Consumer Prot., supra note 73, at ch. VI(C).
100. Cal. State Bd. of Optometry v. FTC, 910 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
101. Office of Policy Planning, Report of the State Action Task Force 1 (2003).
102. Daniel A. Crane, The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement
135–41 (2011) [hereinafter Crane, Institutional Structure].
103. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986) (holding that “[t]he standard
of ‘unfairness’ under the FTC Act . . . encompass[es] not only practices that violate the Sher-
man Act and the other antitrust laws . . . but also practices that the Commission determines
are against public policy for other reasons”); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966)
(holding that the FTC may go further than the reach of the Sherman Act and “stop in their
incipiency acts and practices which, when full blown, would violate those Acts” (quoting FTC
v. Motion Picture Advert. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394–95 (1953))).
104. See Crane, Institutional Structure, supra note 102, at 136–38.
December 2016] State-Action Immunity and Section 5 of the FTC Act 381
agency was facing serious political difficulties in Washington due to its per-
ceived overreaching in its consumer protection mission.105 A chastened FTC
retreated in the 1980s and forward, tying its antitrust enforcement authority
to the judicially determined meaning of the Sherman Act.106 If the FTC Act
was practically coextensive with the Sherman Act for substantive liability
purposes, then the preemptive scope of the two statutes might as well be
equivalent, too.
In recent years, the FTC has slowly begun to reassert an independent
Section 5 power not tied to the meaning of the Sherman Act.107 In the sum-
mer of 2015, the commission, for the first time, articulated guidance on the
circumstances under which it might bring an independent Section 5 case.108
Section 5 remains politically controversial, with critics fearing an uncon-
strained exercise of enforcement authority by the commission.109 Nonethe-
less, the commission’s renewed interest in the meaning of Section 5,
coinciding with its growing interest in state regulations stifling competi-
tion—particularly competition arising from new technologies110—suggests
that the time is ripe for reconsideration of the issue left open in Ticor: Does
the Parker doctrine constrain the FTC in the assertion of its enforcement
authority under Section 5?
II. The FTC Act and Superior Preemption in Historical Context
As noted earlier, the Parker court found “no suggestion of a purpose to
restrain state action in the [Sherman] Act’s legislative history.”111 Indeed, if
anything, the Sherman Act’s legislative history suggests that Congress had
105. Id. at 31 (discussing the FTC’s political setbacks in the late 1970s and 1980s).
106. E.g., Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 462 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (observing that the
commission had expressly limited its theory of liability to conduct that would violate Section 2
of the Sherman Act).
107. See, e.g., In re Motorola Mobility LLC, No. 121–0120, 2013 WL 3944149 (F.T.C. July
23, 2013); In re Intel Corp., No. 9341, 2010 WL 4542454 (F.T.C. Nov. 2, 2010); In re Negoti-
ated Data Solutions LLC, No. 051–0094, 2008 WL 258308 (F.T.C. Jan. 22, 2008).
108. See Policy Statement, FTC, Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair
Methods of Competition” Under Section 5 of the FTC Act (Aug. 13, 2015), https://
www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2015/08/statement-enforcement-principles-regarding-unfair-
methods-competition [https://perma.cc/3D7F-4AR8].
109. Thomas Dahdouh, Section 5, the FTC and Its Critics: Just Who Are the Radicals Here?,
Competition J. Antitrust & Unfair Competition L. Sec. St. B. Cal., Fall 2011, at 1, 1–2
(2011) (collecting sharp criticisms of independent Section 5 enforcement).
110. The FTC has shown considerable interest in issues such as automobile distribution in
the new economy, see, e.g., Auto Distribution: Current Issues & Future Trends, FTC (Jan 19,
2016, 9:00AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2016/01/auto-distribution-
current-issues-future-trends [https://perma.cc/4775-EKHY], and state regulation of the shar-
ing economy, see, e.g., The “Sharing” Economy: Issues Facing Platforms, Participants, and Regu-
lators, FTC (Jun. 9, 2015, 8:30AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2015/06/
sharing-economy-issues-facing-platforms-participants-regulators [https://perma.cc/2WKE-
GDY4]).
111. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
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greater concerns about purely private restraints on competition and monop-
olies than restraints arising from state regulation.112
The situation is quite different when it comes to the FTC Act of 1914.
While the historical context and legislative history of the FTC Act do not
unambiguously suggest a congressional desire for the agency to wield pre-
emptive power over state regulation, issues concerning conflicts between
state and federal power were very much in the air in the period leading up to
the passage of the FTC Act and in its immediate legislative history. In partic-
ular, there are two significant currents that should be relevant to any effort
to divine the scope of the FTC’s preemptive jurisdiction from the Act’s his-
torical context.
First, the FTC Act—which created a trade commission with broad pro-
phylactic powers—evolved from earlier proposals for an expanded Bureau of
Corporations with the power to require federal chartering and regulation of
large interstate corporations, and that would effectively preempt the states’
role in organizing and regulating interstate business organizations.113
Though these legislative proposals ultimately failed, the fact that their impe-
tus was resolved in the creation of the FTC supports the view that the FTC
was intended to solve problems of state corporate law.
Second, and more directly, congressional debate over the FTC Act pro-
ceeded in the immediate aftermath of the highly salient Shreveport Rate deci-
sion, which upheld the Interstate Commerce Commission’s preemptive
power over state railroad-rate regulation. References to the ICC as a model
for the FTC abound in the legislative history, and the Shreveport Rate deci-
sion was specifically invoked as a positive precedent for the new
commission.114
A. State Corporate Law Failure, Preemptive Federal Incorporation,
and the FTC and Clayton Acts
Consistent with the court’s assertion in Parker, analysis of the preemp-
tive scope of the Sherman and FTC Acts may turn in part on the legislative
context of each statute with respect to federal–state power allocations. On
that question, the two statutes’ contexts differ significantly. On one level,
both statutes addressed a common problem: the growing economic power of
large industrial organizations and massive aggregations of capital occasioned
by the Second Industrial Revolution. But, on another level, the statutes of
1890 and 1914 reflected very different background assumptions about the
nature of the trust problem, federalism, state corporate law, and compara-
tive institutional capacity.
112. See Richard Squire, Antitrust and the Supremacy Clause, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 77, 106
(2006) (“[W]e . . . have evidence that Congress intended to leave intact some state regulation it
thought it could preempt. . . . includ[ing] Senator Sherman’s intimations on the congressional
record that private firms should enjoy less power than states to restrain economic
competition.”).
113. See infra notes 127–146 and accompanying text.
114. See infra Section II.B.
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The Sherman Act arose in a context in which the Gilded Age trusts were
widely accused of making end-runs around state corporate law to acquire
and exploit undue levels of economic power.115 The states unsuccessfully at-
tempted to control the trusts by enforcing corporate law restrictions.116 In
particular, state attorneys general initiated quo writs to challenge as ultra
vires the various corporate charter activities, such as doing business outside
the state, conducting business outside the scope of the charter, and owning
the shares of other corporations.117 Efforts to control the trusts using ex-
isting corporate law limitations sometimes proved successful,118 but state
corporate law enforcement did little overall to stem the rising tide of the
trusts,119 in large part because the formal requirements and prohibitions of
state corporate law could so easily be avoided by creative corporate law-
yers.120 Further, under the prevailing dualism of commerce clause jurispru-
dence, states could regulate only intrastate commerce and could not reach
interstate activities.121 Hence, state regulation was largely ineffective in ad-
dressing the trust problem.
The Congress that enacted the Sherman Act in 1890 spoke of the states
largely as helpless victims of the trusts rather than as their facilitators. Sena-
tor Sherman in particular took a leading role in describing the states as will-
ing, but ineffective, partners in the effort to control large aggregations of
capital. For example, Senator Sherman cited New York’s inability to control
the Sugar Trust through litigation as evidence of the need for federal legisla-
tion.122 Elsewhere, Sherman described the states as actively engaged in the
effort to control the trusts, but practically unable to reign them in because
115. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836–1937, at 63–64
(1991).
116. See id.
117. See id. at 63. Before the liberalization of corporate law in the late nineteenth century,
most states severely restricted corporate powers, for example, by limiting corporations to a
single line of business and prohibiting stock ownership by a corporation. See Melvin I. Urof-
sky, Proposed Federal Incorporation in the Progressive Era, 26 Am J.L. Hist. 160, 161 (1982).
118. See, e.g., State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137 (1892); see also
Bruce Bringhurst, Antitrust and the Oil Monopoly: The Standard Oil Cases,
1890–1911, at 14 (1979).
119. Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy 155–60 (1954).
120. Hovenkamp, supra note 115, at 249. In particular, organizing a business organiza-
tion through a trust rather than a corporation allowed the organization to circumvent many of
the strictures of corporate law. See Jonathan W. Singer, Broken Trusts: The Texas Attor-
ney General Versus the Oil Industry, 1889–1909, at 7 (2002) (recounting maneuvers by
Texas oil corporations to circumvent Texas’s corporate restrictions by forming partnerships
rather than corporations).
121. See Andrew I. Gavil, Reconstructing the Jurisdictional Foundation of Antitrust Federal-
ism, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 657, 674–78 (1993); William L. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman
Antitrust Law: 1887–1890, 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 221, 250–51 (1956); James May, Antitrust Prac-
tice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Anti-
trust Law, 1880–1918, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 495, 510 & n.86 (1987).
122. 21 Cong. Rec. 2568–69 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
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of jurisdictional limitations.123 The Act’s sponsors described themselves as
not supplanting, but bolstering, state law124 by enacting the common law of
restraints of trade and monopolies as a federal statute.125 The Sherman Act’s
legislative history abounds with references to the states’ willingness, but
practical inability, to manage the trust problem and, hence, the need for a
federal solution.126
Although the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887
provided a potential administrative regulatory model for antitrust legisla-
tion, very little consideration was given in 1890 to an administrative model
that might preempt state law.127 Rather, the Sherman Act adopted a “crime-
tort” corrective model concerned with identifying and punishing undesir-
able conduct through prosecutorial and judicial channels.128 The Sherman
Act’s model expressed desired continuity with the substance of state law and
its primarily judicial enforcement mechanisms.
By contrast, the FTC Act arose from a context in which political elites
squarely blamed the continuation of the trust problem on the liberalization
of state law. The federal legislative reforms marked a sharp departure from
both the substance of state law and its institutional forms. Whereas preemp-
tion of state law was, as Parker notes, absent from the conversation in1890, it
was clearly present in the years leading up to 1914.
From roughly the turn of the century until the passage of the FTC Act,
and particularly following the great merger wave of 1895–1904,129 a develop-
ing Progressive narrative laid much of the blame for the continuation of the
123. See, e.g., Thorelli, supra note 119, at 181 (citing Senator Sherman’s statement that
“[t]he power of the State courts has been repeatedly exercised to set aside such combinations
. . . but these courts are limited in their jurisdiction to the State, and, in our complex system of
government, are admitted to be unable to deal with the great evil that now threatens us”).
124. See, e.g., id. (quoting Senator Sherman as saying, “[t]his bill, as I would have it, has
for its single object to invoke the aid of the courts of the United States to . . . supplement the
enforcement of the established rules of the common and statute law by the courts of the
several States in dealing with combinations that affect injuriously the industrial liberty of the
citizens of these States”).
125. Id. at 228 (“There is ample evidence that not only the bills reported by Sherman in
the 51st Congress but also the bill finally passed were intended by their sponsors primarily to
be federal codifications of the common law of England and the several states.”).
126. See id. at 181 (referencing Senator Sherman’s description of the Sherman Act as a
supplement to states’ antitrust efforts); id. at 183 (referencing Senator Sherman’s claim that
state courts “have vigorously used the judicial power in subverting” unlawful trusts); Letwin,
supra note 121, at 252–53 (describing Senator Sherman’s endorsement of a Michigan Supreme
Court opinion holding illegal a match monopoly, and explaining the need for federal legisla-
tion to bring about the effectiveness of common law restrictions on anticompetitive behavior).
127. Thorelli, supra note 119, at 229–30.
128. See generally Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (2008)
[hereinafter Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism] (describing a historical aversion to direct federal
regulation of corporations and preference for locating “bad acts” rather than creating an ap-
propriate corporate structure).
129. See generally Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American
Business 1895–1904 (1985) (exploring the causes of the wave of mergers which swept through
the manufacturing sector during this period).
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trust problem at the feet of the state legislatures, which had so liberalized
corporate law as to remove any meaningful check on the exercise of corpo-
rate power.130 Unlike the Sherman Act, the FTC Act grew out of a political
context in which states often were described not as victims of the trusts, but,
rather, as their facilitators. The FTC Act was thus directed at curbing an-
ticompetitive market structures facilitated by the states themselves.
The story of state corporate law liberalization and its relationship to
federal incorporation or licensing proposals and the antitrust problem is
both lengthy and familiar;131 an abbreviated version will suffice here. During
the Jacksonian period, incorporation moved from a special incorporation
model, where charters had to be procured by special legislative acts, to a
general incorporation model, where any qualifying business could incorpo-
rate simply by registering and paying the required fee.132 But as the corporate
form became widely available, it remained widely restrictive in terms of the
powers it gave corporations.133 After the Civil War, many states began to
liberalize their incorporation laws in an attempt to attract firms to incorpo-
rate in their state. And so started the “race to the bottom”—at least in the
sense of removing many of the restrictions in state corporation law that state
attorneys general had invoked in antitrust efforts during the pre–Sherman
Act years.134 States competing to become incorporation havens eventually
permitted corporations to own stock of other companies and granted
favorable tax treatment for out-of-state earnings.135 In New Jersey, for exam-
ple, the state allowed corporate charters “for any lawful business purpose
whatsoever”; dispensed with requirements that directors be state residents
and that corporate meetings be held within the state; allowed unlimited cap-
italization; eliminated shareholder liability for corporate debts; and stopped
requiring public disclosure of annual reports.136
These liberalization movements in state corporate law were afoot in
1890, but had not yet been fully realized. During debates over the Sherman
Act, some congressmen intimated that the trust problem was deeply
grounded in state corporate law and, hence, that the solution must lie in
state legislation.137 The intense focus on the liberalization of state corporate
130. See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Transformation of Modern Corporation Law: The Law of
Corporate Groups, 37 Conn. L. Rev. 605, 607–08 (2005).
131. Daniel A. Crane, The Dissociation of Incorporation and Regulation in the Progressive
Era and the New Deal, in The Corporation and American Democracy (William Novak &
Naomi Lamoreaux eds., forthcoming 2017) (on file with Michigan Law Review).
132. See Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, supra note 128, at 2, 8–12.
133. See id. at 12.
134. Id.
135. Ernst Von Halle, Trusts or Industrial Combinations and Coalitions in the
United States 94–95 (1900).
136. Id. at 96 (quoting William H. Corbin, An Act Concerning Corporations 8
(14th ed. 1908)).
137. See Thorelli, supra note 119, at 204 (reporting statements of Rep. Wilson that, since
“the organization of a trust must have the corporation as a basis . . . the first and most effective
blow at that organization must be struck, not by Congress, but by the States”).
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law as contributing to the trust problem, however, did not emerge until after
the Sherman Act’s passage. That was due in large part to the fact that the
most dramatic movements toward state corporate law liberalization were
still in progress in 1890.
The central player in this sweep toward liberalization was the State of
New Jersey. Through the New Jersey Holding Company Act of 1889, the
state facilitated the Standard Oil and Northern Securities trusts, among
others, by permitting a corporation to own the stock of another corpora-
tion.138 Although the Holding Company Act predated the Sherman Act, the
full impact of New Jersey’s enabling of large corporate scale and powers was
realized in a succession of liberalizing statutes in the 1890s—in 1893, 1896,
1897, and 1898. The 1896 statute proved the most significant in creating a
distinctive and nationally accessible New Jersey brand in corporate law.139
From 1896 to the turn of the century, the liberalization of New Jersey corpo-
rate law wielded an irresistible, magnetic pull on American corporations and
earned the State of New Jersey enormous economic benefits.140
The competitive pressures on other states occasioned by New Jersey’s
legislative reforms proved overwhelming. Within a few years, most states
began to liberalize their corporate laws dramatically.141 New Jersey’s signifi-
cant revenues came from its status as the least restrictive state of incorpora-
tion; in order to attract future business, other states would have to be less
restrictive still.142 The race to the bottom would not end before the majority
of states had repealed the corporate restrictions that had previously helped
control the trusts.143 These corporate law reforms eliminated the possibility
that state corporate law could function as an effective antitrust device.144
138. See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the His-
tory of the Industrial Enterprise 30 (1962) (discussing how the passage of the New Jersey
law aided the Standard Oil Company); Blumberg, supra note 130, at 607 (describing the New
Jersey law as “pathbreaking legislation” that facilitated Standard Oil’s reorganization); Christo-
pher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875–1929, 49 J. Econ. Hist. 677, 681
(1989) (detailing the liberalization of New Jersey corporate law in the late 1880s); Marc
Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and Competition, 71
Antitrust L.J. 1, 6 (2003) (discussing the 1889 law and litigation that followed the formation
of the Standard Oil and Northern Securities Trusts).
139. Charles M. Yablon, The Historical Race: Competition for Corporate Charters and the
Rise and Decline of New Jersey: 1880–1910, 32 J. Corp. L. 323, 349 (2007).
140. Between 1896 and 1901, corporate filing fees and franchise taxes in New Jersey
swelled from $800,000 to $2,189,000, accounting for 60% of the state’s revenues. Urofsky,
supra note 117, at 164. By 1901, 95% of the nation’s large corporations were incorporated in
New Jersey. Id. By 1902, New Jersey had earned so much from corporate filing fees and
franchise taxes “that it had paid off the state debt and abolished property taxes.” Id. By 1905, it
had a surplus of nearly $3 million in the treasury, mostly attributable to its corporate liberali-
zation initiative. Id.
141. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, supra note 128, at 13.
142. See id. at 12–13 (detailing that, upon seeing New Jersey’s gains from liberalization,
other states followed suit “with an eye toward attracting firms to incorporate in their state”).
143. Id. at 12.
144. See id. at 13.
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As these corporate liberalization reforms proceeded, academics, lawyers,
and politicians began to link the trust problem with a failure of state corpo-
rate law.145 If state corporate liberalization was contributing to the accelera-
tion of the trust problem notwithstanding the Sherman Act, the question
naturally arose as to whether federal legislation to correct state corporate law
was required. Around the turn of the century, the possibility of a federal
incorporation statute became a popular topic among academics and leading
members of the bar, with many prominent voices strongly in favor.146 Pro-
ponents of federal incorporation argued that mandatory federal incorpora-
tion, or restrictive licensing for corporations engaged in interstate
commerce, could allow the state—now conceived as the federal, rather than
state, government—to reassert control over corporate entities.147
These indictments of state corporate law prompted a course of political
action in Congress and the White House that ultimately culminated in the
145. For example, in 1895, the German economist Ernst Von Halle noted the irony of the
simultaneous liberalization of corporate law and adoption of antitrust law: “We now have the
strange spectacle of the enactment of the most severe laws against trusts and combinations on
the one hand, and on the other of a transformation of the corporation law which facilitated
the remodeling of the trusts, and their continued transaction of business in the state.” Von
Halle, supra note 135, at 95. In 1900, the treatise-writer Christopher Tiedeman would blame
the entire trust problem on state corporate law and propose a return to incorporation by
special legislation only. 1 Christopher G. Tiedeman, A Treatise on State and Federal
Control of Persons and Property in the United States 609–10 (1900).
146. See, e.g., E. Parmalee Prentice, The Federal Power Over Carriers and Corpo-
rations 149–55 (1907); Charles W. Bunn, Federal Incorporation of Railway Companies, 30
Harv. L. Rev. 589 (1917); James B. Dill, Address, National Incorporation Laws for Trusts, 11
Yale L.J. 273 (1902); E. W. Huffcut, Address, Constitutional Aspects of the Federal Control of
Corporations, 34 Am. L. Rev. 186, 200–04 (1900); Walter S. Logan, Address, National Incorpo-
ration and Control of Corporations, 37 Am. L. Rev. 237 (1903); John E. Parsons, Federal Regula-
tion of Corporations: A Dangerous Departure, 17 Green Bag 135 (1905); John Bell Sanborn,
Federal Control of Corporations, 37 Am. L. Rev. 703 (1903); Thomas Thacher, Federal Control
of Corporations, 14 Yale L.J. 301 (1905); H. L. Wilgus, Need of National Incorporation Law, 2
Mich. L. Rev. 358 (1904).
147. An 1899 Chicago Conference on Trusts, sponsored by the Chicago Civic Federation,
led a number of prominent public figures to call for direct federal control of the trusts. See,
e.g., Urofsky, supra note 117, at 168–69. William Jennings Bryan advocated mandatory federal
licensing for corporations doing business outside their home state and accompanying stringent
requirements regarding capitalization and business policies. Id. at 166. James Garfield, in his
first annual report to Congress as commissioner of the Bureau of Corporations, argued that
competition between incorporating jurisdictions had led to “an inevitable tendency of State
legislation toward the lowest level of lax regulation and of extreme favor toward this special
class of incorporators, regardless of the interests of the other classes properly concerned.”
Dep’t of Com. and Lab., Report of the Commissioner of Corporations, H.R. Doc. No.
165, at 40 (1904). University of Michigan Law Professor H. L. Wilgus asserted that, though
states were the incorporating sovereigns, they had lost their practical—and, indeed, constitu-
tional—power to regulate trusts operating in interstate power, thus requiring federal incorpo-
ration as an antidote. Wilgus, supra note 146, at 372. Even James Dill, the author of New
Jersey’s much-maligned Holding Company Act, argued that “[t]he country demands uniform
corporate legislation, formulated upon the good of the country as a whole, and not sectional
legislation, state against state.” Dill, supra note 146, at 274.
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passage of the FTC and Clayton Acts in 1914.148 The first bill, introduced in
1900 by Congressman Edwin R. Ridgely of Kansas, would have established a
federal licensing scheme for corporations operating in interstate com-
merce.149 There followed a series of bills that would have required firms op-
erating in interstate commerce to be federally licensed or incorporated and
comply with federal regulatory requirements.150
Endorsing the view that the roots of the trust problem lay in the emas-
culation of state corporate law, President Theodore Roosevelt explicitly tied
the power to incorporate to the power to regulate.151 He achieved a modest
step toward direct, federal superintendence of large corporations that oper-
ate in interstate commerce through a 1903 act of Congress that created a
Bureau of Corporations with limited investigatory powers over corpora-
tions.152 Throughout his administration, Roosevelt continued to press for
legislation giving the federal government direct supervisory authority over
interstate corporations.153 He came closest to getting a corporate control bill
when, on March 23, 1908, Congressman William Hepburn of the Commit-
tee on Interstate Commerce introduced what became known as the Hepburn
Bill.154 At a high level of generality, there were two competing options on the
table: a commission model (in line with the Federal Trade Commission
model ultimately adopted in 1914) and a federal-incorporation or corpo-
rate-registration-and-licensing model.155 The Roosevelt Administration
steered the proposal away from a commission model and toward corporate
registration and licensing. Roosevelt himself eventually took over negotia-
tions and pushed for a tough version of the bill that would grant the execu-
tive branch significant control over corporations operating in interstate
commerce.156
148. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Federalism, and the Theory of the Firm: An
Historical Perspective, 59 Antitrust L.J. 75, 77 (1990).
149. Thorelli, supra note 119, at 513; Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Note, Corporate Privileges
for the Public Benefit: The Progressive Federal Incorporation Movement and the Modern Regula-
tory State, 77 Va. L. Rev. 603, 623–25 (1991).
150. Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism 132–33 (1963).
151. Edmund Morris, Theodore Rex 73 (2001) (“It is no limitation upon property
rights or freedom of contract to require that when men receive from government the privilege
of doing business under corporate form . . . they shall do so upon absolutely truthful represen-
tations. . . . Great corporations exist only because they are created and safeguarded by our
institutions; and it is therefore our right and duty to see that they work in harmony with these
institutions.”).
152. Act of Feb. 14, 1903, ch. 552, § 6, 32 Stat. 825, 827–28 (1903).
153. William Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America 244–47 (1965).
154. An Act to Regulate Commerce, Etc.: Hearings on H.R. 19745 in the H.R., 60th Cong.
15–17 (1908) (statement of Mr. Low). The story of the Hepburn Bill’s initial momentum,
languishment, and eventual defeat has been meticulously recounted by Martin Sklar. Martin
J. Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism, 1890–1916, at
228–85 (1988).
155. See Sklar, supra note 154, at 228–85, 419–21.
156. Id. at 235–36.
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The Hepburn Bill—which would have created a regime of federal regis-
tration to essentially replace state incorporation—initially attracted signifi-
cant political support. But, for labor-regulation reasons largely unrelated to
corporate regulation,157 the bill lost traction after the Supreme Court’s Feb-
ruary 3, 1908, decision in Loewe v. Lawlor (the Danbury Hatters’ case).158
President Taft initially supported a federal-registration or incorporation bill,
but shifted politically in the direction of a traditional law enforcement
model following the Supreme Court’s landmark Standard Oil Co. v. United
States159 decision.160
It was this history—a broad Progressive reaction against failures of state
corporate law, political action in the direction of preemptive, federal-corpo-
rate legislation, and a subsequent period of conservative retrenchment dur-
ing the Taft administration—that set the stage for the 1912 presidential
election and the two antitrust reform statutes of 1914: the FTC and Clayton
Acts.161 Although Wilson and his antitrust guru, Louis Brandeis, would ulti-
mately reject an incorporation or registration model and opt instead for a
commission model, that decision came as the result of protracted contesta-
tion—spanning a decade and a half—over how to respond to a failure of
state corporate law.162 Between 1900 and 1914, the central political question
concerning the trusts was what mode of federal regulation could effectively
address the anticompetitive pathologies created by the liberalization of state
corporate law. In contrast with 1890—when the trust problem was framed
in terms of market failures that the states had dutifully, but unsuccessfully,
attempted to remedy—the conversation leading up to 1914 was framed in
terms of political failures occasioned by the race to the bottom in state cor-
porate law.
B. The FTC, the ICC, and the Shreveport Rate Case
When Congress took up antitrust reform in 1914, it did so in the
shadow of significant legal and regulatory developments concerning the
scope of federal preemptive power and the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion. The FTC Act’s legislative history abounds with references to the ICC as
a prototype for the new Federal Trade Commission. Congressional debates
about the ICC and the scope and preemptive effect of the federal commerce
power show a Congress deeply interested in the relationship between the
157. Id. at 204–05, 223, 232–33.
158. 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (upholding application of the Sherman Act to secondary labor
boycotts), superseded by statute, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2012).
159. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
160. Letwin, supra note 153, at 252, 266–67.
161. See Sklar, supra note 154, at 309–23.
162. See id. at 325–28; Sidney M. Milkis, The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer
Protection: Regulatory Change and Administrative Pragmatism, 72 Antitrust L.J. 911, 911–12
(2005).
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FTC and state law. The landmark and highly salient Shreveport Rate Case,163
decided on the cusp of the Senate’s deliberation over the FTC Act, upheld
the ICC’s preemptive power over state railroad regulation. The ICC’s histori-
cal trajectory on the question of state law preemption is particularly relevant
to the interpretation of the FTC Act, because the ICC’s preemptive power, in
significant doubt for over two decades, crystalized just on the verge of the
FTC Act’s passage. In its immediate historical context, a congressional intent
to model the FTC on the ICC fairly suggests a congressional will that the
FTC enjoy preemptive power over inconsistent state regulation.
1. The ICC and the Shreveport Rate Case
Congress created the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 to solve
the diametrically opposed problems of hyper-competition and rate discrimi-
nation.164 The originating Act prohibited “every unjust and unreasonable
charge.”165 Tasked with investigating alleged violations of the Act, the com-
mission functioned more like a special master for Article III courts than the
tribunals of the modern administrative state.166
The Supreme Court was initially hostile to the commission’s assertion of
extensive regulatory powers.167 Thus, the Court found no authority in the
Interstate Commerce Act to allow the ICC to prescribe rates based on its
power to determine rate reasonableness.168 While the commission’s findings
of fact were, by statute, prima facie evidence in a district court proceeding,
the Supreme Court nonetheless determined that ICC fact-finding should be
reviewed de novo.169 The commission had fully endorsed collective ratemak-
ing associations created and managed by the railroads (i.e., cartels), but
courts found that such cartels violated the Sherman Act.170 By 1903, the
commission was acutely aware of its limited role in railroad regulation, not-
ing that “[a]t present Commission can investigate and report. It has no
163. Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States (The Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342
(1914).
164. See George M. Chandler, The Interstate Commerce Commission—The First Twenty-
Five Years, 16 Transp. L.J. 53, 54–55 (1987). But see Randal C. Picker, The Interstate Commerce
Act and the Sherman Act: Playing Railroad Tycoon, 95 Marq. L. Rev. 1135, 1139–40 (2012)
(asserting that the Interstate Commerce Act left unresolved the basic question of whether it
intended to encourage competition among railroad carriers). For a background on the state of
the railway industry before the Interstate Commerce Act, see generally Herbert Hovenkamp,
Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad Problem, 97 Yale L.J. 1017
(1988).
165. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379.
166. Id. § 12.
167. E.g., Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 184, 196 (1896)
(concluding that the Interstate Commerce Act did not expressly or impliedly give the Interstate
Commerce Commission the power to set railroad rates), superseded by statute, Mann-Elkins
Act, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539 (1910).
168. Id.
169. ICC v. Ala. Midland Ry., 168 U.S. 144, 175 (1897).
170. Chandler, supra note 164, at 57.
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power to determine what rate is reasonable, and such orders as it can make
have no binding effect.”171
Congress responded by passing several statutes significantly enhancing
the ICC’s rulemaking and preemptive authority.172 The Elkins Act of 1903
required railroads to file rates with the commission.173 In 1906, Congress
legislatively overruled the Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati,
New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway decision174 and granted the commis-
sion the power to prescribe rates that it found unreasonable.175 The Mann-
Akins Act of 1910 strengthened the commission’s investigative powers by
giving it the authority to enjoin rate changes until the investigation of a
rate’s reasonableness was complete.176
Even while hostile to federal railroad regulation by the ICC, the Lochner-
era Supreme Court was also skeptical about the assertion of regulatory au-
thority by the states. Even before the passage of the FTC Act, the Court
limited state regulation of railroad activity to purely intrastate routes—
routes that did not cross state borders.177 The substantive reasonableness of
any state-set rate was held reviewable by a federal court in a due process
challenge.178 After condemning a state-set maximum rate as too low to meet
costs and allow for a reasonable rate of return,179 federal courts faced a flood
of substantive challenges to state-established rates.180
As the ICC’s statutory powers grew to overlap with regulatory decisions
by the states, the courts began to develop a preemption doctrine that clari-
fied the respective spheres of federal and state regulatory authority over the
railroads.181 In 1912, the Court found that the Interstate Commerce Act was
a “specific action” by Congress “covering the matters which [a North Caro-
lina railroad regulation statute was] attempt[ing] to regulate,” so Congress
had “taken possession of the field” of railroad-rate regulation.182 A year later,
the Court reaffirmed Congress’s preemption power, finding that the
171. 17 ICC Ann. Rep. 17 (1903).
172. See Hovenkamp, supra note 164, at 1067–68.
173. Elkins Act, ch. 708, § 1, 32 Stat. 847, 847 (1903) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§11903 (2012)).
174. 167 U.S. 479 (1896).
175. Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, § 4, 34 Stat. 584 (1906).
176. Mann-Elkins Act, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539 (1910).
177. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 575–77 (1886).
178. See Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
179. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), overruled by Fed. Power Comm’n v. Nat. Gas
Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942).
180. Hovenkamp, supra note 164, at 1059.
181. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 767, 803–04
(1994).
182. S. Ry. Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424, 437 (1912).
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Hepburn Act, “from the moment that Congress” enacted it, rendered “im-
potent” those state regulations that governed the duty of common carriers
to regularly furnish railcars.183
By 1914—specifically, in the months running up to congressional delib-
eration over the FTC and Clayton Acts—two significant questions relevant
to the ICC’s authority remained open: How far into intrastate commerce
could Congress venture, and to what extent could Congress delegate its pre-
emptive authority to a regulatory agency like the ICC? These questions were
answered on June 8, 1914, when the Court issued its opinion in Houston,
East and West Texas Railway Co. v. United States, more commonly known as
the Shreveport Rate Case.184
The Court held that the ICC could force the Texas Railroad Commis-
sion to comply with a rate-setting order, even for purely intrastate rates.185
Congress’s Commerce Clause power allowed it to regulate purely intrastate
commercial activity if that activity had “such close and substantial relation
to” interstate commerce.186 By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, “it is Con-
gress, and not the State, that is entitled to prescribe the final and dominant
rule.”187
The Court then examined whether the ICC was acting within its dele-
gated power in finding Texas’s rate discrimination unreasonable and affirm-
atively setting reasonable rates. The Court recognized that Congress’s grant
of authority in Section 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act was “sweeping
enough to embrace all the discriminations” which Congress could condemn,
and the ICC’s actions were fully consistent with the proffered purpose of the
Act, which was to prevent unjust discrimination in transportation—the
“paramount evil” of commerce.188 The Court then observed a potential limit
on the ICC’s power in Section 1 of the Act (which was reenacted as part of
the Hepburn Amendment): “the provisions of this act shall not” apply to
transportation “wholly within one State.”189
Building on a construction of the Section 1 limitation it had previously
discussed in dicta,190 the Court concluded that the ICC’s actions were
proper.191 It reasoned that “[t]he powers conferred by the [A]ct are not
thereby limited where interstate commerce itself is involved,” but extend to
situations where “unjust discrimination against interstate trade arises from
the relation of intrastate to interstate rates as maintained by . . . carrier[s]
183. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Hardwick Farmers Elevator Co., 226 U.S. 426, 435
(1913).
184. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
185. See Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 353–54.
186. Id. at 351.
187. Id. at 351–52.
188. Id. at 355–56 (quoting S. Rep. No. 49–46, pt. 1, at 215 (1886)).
189. Id. at 356 (quoting Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379
(1887)).
190. See Simpson v. Shepard (Minnesota Rate Cases), 230 U.S. 352, 419–20 (1913).
191. See Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 357–59.
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subject to the [A]ct.”192 Circling back to preemption, the Court closed the
opinion by declaring that, “where the interests of the freedom of interstate
commerce are involved, the judgment of Congress and of the agencies it
lawfully establishes must control.”193
The benefit of hindsight has drawn into doubt the decision’s long-term
influence on Commerce Clause jurisprudence leading up to the switch-in-
time jurisprudence of the New Deal.194 Nonetheless, the decision was popu-
larly received as a landmark assertion of federal supremacy and preemption.
The Washington Post ran a headline proclaiming that the ICC was “Above
State Laws.”195 The New York World described the opinion as one supporting
the “unrestricted power of the Interstate Commerce Commission over inter-
state commerce.”196 Many reports of the decision keyed in on Justice
Hughes’s assertion that “it was recognized from the beginning that the Na-
tion could not prosper if interstate and foreign trade were governed by many
masters.”197 The New York Sun reached out to members of the ICC, who
emphasized the importance of the decision and noted that its effect “will be
to concentrate authority in the Interstate Commerce Commission and re-
duce to a minimum the power of the State commissions.”198
Whatever the long-term influence of the Shreveport Rate Case, speaking
about the ICC in the latter half of 1914 necessarily meant talking about the
fact that Congress could regulate intrastate commercial activity, that Con-
gress could preempt state regulation over the same conduct while doing so,
and that Congress could fully delegate this regulatory authority to its
agencies.
192. Id. at 358.
193. Id. at 360.
194. See Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1089, 1130–31 (2000) (suggesting that Shreveport was inherently limited by the
Lochner era’s due process analysis and concluding that “[t]he due process context of Shreveport
thus severely constrained the range of its application to intrastate matters. Here again, unless
we restore Shreveport to its due process environment, we cannot appreciate its meaning. For if
you Shepardize Shreveport, you will find that every case following it from its announcement in
1914 up to the mid-1930s involved regulation of a business affected with a public interest:
railroads”). But see Richard D. Friedman, The Sometimes-Bumpy Stream of Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 981, 988 n.25 (2003) (recognizing that Justice Hughes’s majority
opinion “did not refer to [the Court’s due process] standards” and further recognizing that
“the applicability of Shreveport was not limited in theory” to industries “affected with a public
interest,” and that “when it did come to force [in 1937], its applicability did not depend on the
overthrow . . . of the ‘affected with the public interest’ doctrine”).
195. Above State Laws, Wash. Post, June 9, 1914, at 1.
196. Highest Court Gives U.S. Power Over Railroad, Evening World (N.Y.), June 8, 1914,
at 2.
197. Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 360; Highest Court Gives U.S. Power Over Railroad,
supra note 196, at 2; Nation Dominant Over State Rates, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1914, at 4.
198. U.S. May Control Railway Financing, N.Y. Sun, June 10, 1914, at 4.
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2. The Federal Trade Commission and the ICC
Legislation creating a new antitrust commission was already pending in
Congress when the Shreveport Rate Case came down, but the legislative
movements that shaped the ultimate form of the new commission occurred
immediately in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision. Five days after the
Shreveport Rate Case was decided, Senator Francis G. Newlands introduced
to the Senate a bill to create a Federal Trade Commission.199 Senator Newl-
ands’s bill was a substitute for a bill passed by the House, which had been
overhauled by the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce. The overhaul,
according to Senator Newlands, was designed to “make the trade commis-
sion as useful and effective in building up a system of administrative law
regarding trade as the Interstate Commerce Commission has been in matters
of transportation.”200 The legislative history of the FTC—largely contained
within a two-month Senate debate on the Newlands bill—evinces Con-
gress’s vision for an FTC largely modeled on the ICC.
The prelude to the Newlands bill began prior to the Shreveport Rate
Case decision on April 14, 1914, when the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce recommended that Congress pass H.R. 15613, a bill
to create an Interstate Trade Commission.201 Seeking “the preservation of
proper competitive conditions in our great interstate commerce,”202 the bill
created an investigative body “concerned with the maintenance of proper
supervisory relations of the Federal Government over industrial corpora-
tions engaged in interstate commerce.”203 The House bill thus echoed the
corporate reform themes, grounded in the failure of state corporate law, that
had prevailed in Washington since the turn of the century.
From the start, the FTC (or the ITC, in the language of H.R. 15613) was
designed in the shadow of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The
House Committee’s recommendation recognized the “singular success” of
the ICC,204 and the scope of the commission’s investigatory powers were
often discussed with reference to those of the ICC.205 When the bill passed
the House on June 5, it contained explicit references to the ICC and its
investigatory powers as a model for the new trade commission.206
However, as Senator Newlands would later complain, H.R. 15613 con-
templated insufficient powers for the new commission to be effective in re-
forming the practices of the great industrial corporations that had grown up
199. 51 Cong. Rec. 10,376–77 (1914) (statement of Sen. Newlands).
200. Id. at 10,376.
201. H.R. Rep. No. 63–533, at 1 (1914).
202. Id. at 2.
203. Id. at 8. The commission would also subsume the former Bureau of Corporations
and its embrace its “broadest powers.” Id. at 2.
204. Id. at 8.
205. Id. at 7 (“The powers of investigation conferred upon the commission in the reported
bill are certainly broader than are those of the Interstate Commerce Commission . . . .”).
206. 51 Cong. Rec. 14,921–22 (1914) (quoting H.R. 15613, 63rd Cong. § 16 (1914)).
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since the passage of the Sherman Act.207 The ITC subsumed the powers of
the Bureau of Corporations and was given investigative powers “certainly
broader than those of the [ICC].”208 The House Report on the bill, created
by the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and introduced by
Representative Covington, teemed with references to the ITC’s proposed
powers of investigation: the information obtained could help Congress in
creating new commerce legislation, or help the Department of Justice with
their assault on the trusts.209 But the report went out of its way to disclaim
any power similar to the ICC’s ability to evaluate and set reasonable rates,210
making the distinction fairly explicit.211 The proposed version of the trade
commission thus resembled the ICC prior to the reforms of the previous
decade, which had transformed the agency from an investigatory body to a
preemptive regulator.
On June 13, 1914, less than a week after the decision in the Shreveport
Rate Case, the Newlands bill issued from the Senate Committee on Interstate
Commerce and substituted the House bill with a thoroughly overhauled ver-
sion of the legislation.212 Among the many changes that Senator Newlands
(the bill’s primary author) identified to the Senate on that date was the
power to, “after hearing, . . . prevent unfair competition by order enforcea-
ble in the courts.”213 This power, introduced in Section 5 of the bill, was
among the Senate’s additions intended to make the bill as “useful and effec-
tive in building up a system of administrative law regarding trade as the
[ICC had] been in matters of transportation.”214
Federalism concerns—specifically about the anticompetitive effects of
state corporate liberalization and the weakness of the federal response to
date—remained front and center throughout the congressional deliberations
on the bill. Supporters of the bill argued that the federal courts had been far
too weak in response to the competitive problems created by state corporate
law. In a lengthy speech, Senator Lewis decried the federal courts as offering
a “safe haven” for business interests.215 Using examples from state regulation
207. Id. at 10,376–77.
208. H.R. Rep. No. 63–533, at 7.
209. Id. at 5–6.
210. Id. at 7–8 (“There has been no attempt to deal with the question of maintenance of
fixed prices. The commission has been given no power to pass orders in any way regulating
production. It has not been clothed with authority to make a declaration as to the innocuous-
ness of any particular corporation or agreement . . . .”).
211. Id. at 7–8 (“Having regard for the singular success which the Interstate Commerce
Commission has had upon the relation of the railroads to the public, independently of the
direct power it has exercised to regulate rates and practices, it would seem that the country may
rightfully feel that the interstate trade commission will perform services that will be of inesti-
mable advantage to the business and the future of the country.” (emphasis added)).
212. 51 Cong. Rec. 10,376–78 (statement of Sen. Newlands).
213. Id. at 10,376.
214. Id. at 10,376–77.
215. Id. at 11,303 (statement of Sen. Lewis).
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of railroad rates (“instances of usurpation”),216 including regulation relating
to the Minnesota Rate Cases,217 he argued that “business institutions” had
used federal courts to “paralyz[e]” sovereign state governments.218 He saw
the FTC as a means to control these interests “to the end that democratic
institutions may still survive.”219 Senator Thomas, who believed the bill
might go too far in creating a commission, nonetheless asserted that mo-
nopolies are “the outgrowth of State legislation” and that it is Congress’s
duty to protect “powerless” states from pernicious, pro-monopoly legisla-
tion of other states.220 The June 13 Senate Conference Report extolled the
“value of such administrative oversight and control” to the banking and
transportation industries.221 Senator Newlands contrasted the “dignity, pre-
cision, consecutiveness, and power” of the ICC with the limited efforts by
the Attorney General’s Office in enforcing antitrust laws, and he concluded
that the former was comparatively superior.222
The solution proposed by the Senate and eventually accepted by the
House was to create an ICC for the general administration of commerce.223
In its final form, the bill lost the explicit references to the ICC;224 both the
power of investigation (originally in the House version) and the Section 5
power were explained without reference to the ICC. The Senate Report on
the bill, in discussing the FTC’s “extensive powers of inquiry,” recognized
that these powers were “practically the same as those now granted to the
[ICC] or the Bureau of Corporations.”225 The references to the ICC were
removed, apparently, due to a preference by the House managers to have
powers provided expressly, instead of by reference.226 The Senate’s major
contribution to the bill—the Section 5 power—was introduced to the House
by Representative Covington as granting the FTC a power “somewhat analo-
gous” to the power of the ICC.227
When supporters debated Section 5, they argued that the section was
constitutional because the power it conferred upon the FTC was be rooted in
the same power as the ICC, which had been upheld by the Supreme Court
“wherever [they] have passed upon it”228—including days before the start of
the Senate debate in the Shreveport Rate Case. Senator Newlands summa-
rized his position on Section 5 in an exchange with Senator Kern:
216. Id.
217. Simpson v. Shepard (Minnesota Rate Cases), 230 U.S. 352 (1913).
218. 51 Cong. Rec. 11,303 (statement of Sen. Lewis).
219. Id. at 11,307.
220. Id. at 12,868–69 (statement of Sen. Thomas).
221. S. Rep. No. 63–597, at 9 (1914).
222. 51 Cong. Rec. 12,031 (statement of Sen. Newlands).
223. See id. at 14,943 (recording votes for the House’s adoption of the Senate bill).
224. See id. at 14,926 (statement by Rep. Covington).
225. S. Rep. No. 63–597, at 13.
226. 51 Cong. Rec. 14,926 (statement of Rep. Covington).
227. Id. at 14,928.
228. Id. at 11,180 (statement of Sen. Hollis).
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Mr. Newlands. . . . Briefly speaking, the only contention which can be
made regarding the constitutionality of section 5 is that it is a delegation of
legislative power; that Congress, instead of defining explicitly the offense
that is unlawful, has left it to a commission to determine what acts come
within the general phrase, and has thereby turned over to it one of its
powers of legislation.
Mr. Kern. The same as in the case of the Interstate Commerce
Commission.
Mr. Newlands: Yes.229
On June 27, Senator Robinson, a supporter of the bill, made a similar claim:
Mr. President, the authority given in this bill to the trade commission is
analogous to the authority already conferred by law on the Interstate Com-
merce Commission as to the establishment of reasonable rates and the pre-
vention of discrimination between shippers. In the cases that I have cited
that authority has been upheld as not constituting a[n unconstitutional]
delegation of legislative power or authority.230
Throughout the congressional deliberations, supporters and critics of
the bill held up the ICC as a model of what to expect from the FTC.231
Although FTC preemption of state laws was seldom discussed directly,
the legislative history reveals some additional glimpses of a congressional
assumption that the FTC would enjoy preemptive powers. The clearest ex-
ample arose in a July 30 colloquy between Senator William Chilton of West
Virginia and Senator Albert Cummins of Iowa regarding the effects of the
proposed trade commission and the Clayton Act on property interests cre-
ated by state law. Senator Chilton, a skeptic of the FTC bill, pressed Senator
Cummins, a supporter, on the constitutional difficulties the bill might create
if it resulted in the confiscation of corporate property.232 In particular, Sena-
tor Chilton expressed a concern about the effect of potential retrospective
rulings that one corporation’s ownership of another’s stock amounted to an
229. Id. at 11,112 (statements of Sen. Newlands and Sen. Kern). But see id. at 12,213
(statement of Sen. Sterling) (“I think it is clear that the powers conferred upon the Interstate
Commerce Commission are not analogous to the powers proposed to be conferred by this bill
on the trade commission.”).
230. Id. at 11,231. But, Senator Robinson did not explicitly mention the Shreveport Rates
Case, and instead focused on other cases relating to the scope of Congress’s authority to dele-
gate regulatory power (i.e., nondelegation doctrine jurisprudence). Id.
231. In some instances, members of Congress drew distinctions between the ICC and the
FTC, but without undermining assumptions about the preemptive scope of the FTC’s powers.
In assuaging the concerns of many senators who saw the language of Section 5 as imprecise, if
not impermissibly vague, Senator Hollis contrasted the ICC’s power to determine whether acts
are “unjust or unreasonable,” id. at 11,180 (quoting Interstate Commerce Act), with the FTC’s
mandate to determine whether a party has engaged in competition that is “unfair.” Id. Repre-
sentative Covington suggested an additional distinction—the ICC had affirmative rate-setting
authority, whereas the FTC only had the authority to negate unfair methods of competition.
See id. at 14,791–92 (statement of Sen. Burton).
232. Id. at 12,988–90.
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unfair trade practice.233 Chilton pointed out that his home “State of West
Virginia under its laws specifically authorizes one corporation to hold the
stock of another.”234 He expressed doubt that Congress would have the con-
stitutional authority to prohibit holding companies or corporate stock own-
ership if such corporate structures were permitted by state law.235
Senator Cummins responded unequivocally that Congress would have
the constitutional authority to declare the state holding-company allowance
preempted by federal law:
I can not believe that there is any real doubt with regard to the power of
Congress to prescribe a rule of that character. Otherwise, we have no power
to regulate commerce; otherwise, our power to regulate commerce is
subordinate to the legislation and sovereignty of the States. The Senator
from West Virginia can not doubt our right to say that no monopoly shall
exist, even if the law of a State permitted monopoly.236
Reflecting the then-prevailing scope of the federal commerce power, Senator
Cummins went on to make clear that the preemptive power he envisioned
did not extend to purely intrastate matters.237 But he saw the supremacy of
federal law over anticompetitive state regulations in interstate commerce as
“so certain that it must be accepted as a fundamental proposition.”238 Sena-
tor Charles Thomas of Colorado then chimed in that this was “precisely the
course which [he thought] this legislation should take.”239
We do not wish to overstate what the FTC Act’s legislative history shows
on the issue of commission preemption of anticompetitive state regulation.
Certainly, the sorts of questions raised in Parker and its progeny were not
squarely raised in the 1914 congressional debates. Nonetheless, unlike in
1890, federalism and preemption issues were very much in the air in 1914—
as was a decided congressional preference for a strong federal hand on the
reigns of the interstate economy. Instead of overseeing national incorpora-
tion of businesses, the FTC would offer national regulation of unfair meth-
ods of competition, flexing administrative muscle not unlike the then-
champion of federal supremacy: the Interstate Commerce Commission.
III. Differentiation and the Parker Doctrine
Part II explored the application of the Parker doctrine to the FTC on the
terms enunciated in Parker itself—statutory backdrop and legislative history.
It remains to consider the question from Parker’s unspoken but widely as-
sumed perspective—its reaction to Lochner. To the extent that Parker and its
doctrinal progeny reflect a federal judicial commitment to avoid second-
233. Id. at 12,989.
234. Id. at 12,988 (statement of Sen. Chilton).
235. Id. at 12,989 (statement of Sen. Cummins).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. (statement of Sen. Thomas).
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guessing state economic decisions and to play only a limited role in reinforc-
ing democratic process, do those concerns apply with equal measure to pre-
emptive enforcement by a federal agency, rather than a federal court?240 In
other words, would the FTC be “Lochnerizing” by substantively reviewing
state regulatory regimes that suppress competition? And would the FTC’s
distinctive institutional position alleviate concerns about construing the fed-
eral antitrust laws as a broad, preemptive mandate?
A. The Ghosts of Lochner and the FTC
Whether allowing the FTC a superior-preemptive function with respect
to anticompetitive state regulation would entail a return to subversive
Lochnerism depends on what one views as the objectionable core of Lochner.
As Cass Sunstein has noted, Lochnerism can be understood in two different
ways: either as a judicial usurpation of democratic functions entrusted to
other branches of government, or as an inflexible commitment to certain
formal categories—such as common law baselines, the existing distribution
of wealth and entitlements, and an arbitrary distinction between govern-
ment action and inaction.241 Although the FTC would be differently situated
from federal judicial review of state law on either of these interpretations of
Lochner, the concerns would not vanish altogether with heightened FTC pre-
emptive powers.
As to the first category, the concern over Lochnerism and antitrust re-
lates to the anti-democratic potential for federal judges to replace state legis-
lative decisions with their own economic or regulatory preferences. Such
concerns over judicial usurpation of democratic processes might have less
force if the federal entity entertaining a preemptive decision were an admin-
istrative, rather than a judicial, body. Historically, at least, the political coali-
tions that opposed economic substantive due process during the Progressive
and New Deal eras were comfortable with delegating extensive regulatory
powers to federal administrative agencies.242 Similarly, as William Eskridege
and Gary Peller have noted, the legal process school rejected Lochnerism
because of the political character of judicial activism by unelected judges,
even while supporting activism by institutions, like the FTC, that are—at
least in theory—more democratically accountable.243
240. See Susan A. Creighton & Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Appropriate Role(s) for Section 5,
Antitrust Source, Feb. 2009, at 6 (recognizing that the demise of Lochner means that states
have latitude in adopting anticompetitive regulations, but suggesting that enforcement of Sec-
tion 5 of the FTC Act might be an appropriate antidote in egregious cases).
241. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873, 874–75 (1987).
242. Compare, e.g., Justin O’Brien, The Triumph, Tragedy and Lost Legacy of James
M. Landis 73 (2014) with James M. Landis, The Administrative Process 47–88 (1938).
243. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as
a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 707, 723 (1991); see also Cass R. Sunstein,
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421, 437 (1987) (explaining the
growth of the twentieth century administrative state as a reaction to Lochnerism). On the
democratic accountability of the FTC, see Daniel A. Crane, Debunking Humphrey’s Executor,
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Whether the FTC is sufficiently democratic to assuage concerns about
its checking of state regulations depends on one’s view of the agency’s func-
tional character. The historical justification for the agency’s technocratic in-
dependence from the executive branch rested on the agency’s apolitical,
expert character rather than its democratic responsiveness.244 Nonetheless,
work in social science has shown that the agency is, in fact, politically re-
sponsive to the will of Congress, and, in particular, to the committees with
oversight authority over the agency.245
Even if the commission itself were considered sufficiently politically ac-
countable to meet the first objection to Lochner, having an administrative
agency, rather than a federal court, substantively review anticompetitive
state regulation for conformity with a federal norm would not entirely alle-
viate concerns about a potentially activist judiciary. The federal appellate
courts would still exercise judicial review over commission decisions,246
meaning the courts would still potentially make substantive judgments
about state regulatory decisions, albeit indirectly. Outside the context of
state-action immunity, federal courts reviewing administrative agency deci-
sion are sometimes accused of Lochnerizing when they substitute their own
regulatory preferences or economic perspectives for those of the agency.247
The degree to which this concern would remain poignant in a world of
super-preemption would depend, to a large degree, on the principles and
attitudes federal appellate courts brought to the review of FTC preemption
decisions.
As to the second understanding of Lochner—that it entrenches anti-
redistributionist and laissez faire baselines—the question of FTC super-pre-
emption is also mixed. On the one hand, a heightened preemptive power for
the FTC in competition matters would have a decidedly deregulatory effect.
Unlike its general antitrust enforcement authority—with which the commis-
sion can intervene to block competitive distortions created by private ac-
tors—the commission’s preemptive power over state law could lead to
dismantling state regulatory controls on business behavior. It should be no
surprise that some of the strongest critics of the Parker immunity doctrine
83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1835 (2015) [hereinafter Crane, Debunking Humphrey’s Executor]
(tracking the FTC’s history in light of its original statutory design).
244. Crane, Debunking Humphrey’s Executor, supra note 243, at 1836.
245. Id. at 1838, 1853; see also William E. Kovacic, Congress and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 57 Antitrust L.J. 869, 881–88 (1989) (describing the principal-agent model of FTC-
congressional relations and emphasizing Congress’s ability to exert control over the agency).
246. Appeals from FTC decisions may be lodged in any federal appellate court where the
relevant method of competition was used, or where the business operates. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c)
(2012). Commission determinations of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, and deter-
minations of law are reviewed de novo. McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 824–25 (11th Cir.
2015).
247. See, e.g., Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 837 F.2d 1127, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Mikva,
J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of substituting its own economic preferences with respect
to price discrimination for those of the FTC, in a manner reminiscent of Lochner); Cass R.
Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 653, 666–67
(1985) (expounding the Lochnerian view of the purposes of judicial review).
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have been aligned with the anti-regulatory Chicago School,248 nor that the
recent resurgence in FTC enforcement against anticompetitive state regula-
tions occurred during a generally pro-business Republican administration.249
On the other hand, the FTC’s preemptive agenda would be unlikely to
focus on entrenching established economic interests and, hence, preserving
the status quo in the distribution of property and income. To the contrary,
most anticompetitive state regulations have the effect of entrenching eco-
nomic incumbents and denying entry to new firms and technologies. Al-
though deregulatory, a superior-preemptive FTC enforcement agenda would
hardly reflect the sort of legal and economic stultification concerns that Sun-
stein expresses about Lochner.250
In sum, transferring the substantive review of anticompetitive state laws
from the courts to the FTC would not entirely answer the anti-Lochnerian
concerns that underlay the Parker opinion, and which continue to manifest
themselves in the development of the state-action immunity doctrine. The
degree of concern over substantive due process resurrection one may feel
depends in large measure on how one defines the objectionable core of
Lochner—that is, whether one believes that agency supervision of state regu-
lation bears similar risks to judicial supervision, and how FTC superior-
preemptive authority would cash out operationally. Part IV provides some
preliminary thoughts on how FTC superior preemption might work in prac-
tice, and thus contributes initial fodder for analysis on this latter question.
B. Institutional Constraints and Capacities
Beyond the core concerns about the anti-democratic and pro-laissez
faire tendencies of economic substantive due process, there lurk questions
about institutional constraints and capacities. Allowing the Sherman Act to
become an aggressive anti-regulatory charter would pose considerable risks
of unwieldy and excessive challenges to state regulatory regimes and state
sovereignty, since the Sherman Act is privately enforceable.251 Further, the
248. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. &
Econ. 23 (1983), reprinted in Competition Laws in Conflict 189 (Richard A. Epstein &
Michael S. Greve eds., 2004) (arguing for cost externalization modification to Parker immu-
nity); Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Introduction, in Competition Laws in Con-
flict, supra, at 1, 13 (describing the Parker doctrine as enabling mutual exploitation of
citizens by the states).
249. See Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, FTC, Remarks at the Fordham Annual Conference
on International Antitrust Law & Policy (Oct. 24, 2003), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/public_statements/state-intervention/state-action-u.s.perspective/ford-
ham031024.pdf [https://perma.cc/UFL7-ZMN2] (outlining the FTC’s positive program of at-
tacking state restraints on competition); Melissa Lipman, A Brief History of the FTC’s State
Action Battles, Law360 (Feb. 26, 2015, 8:56 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/625576/a-
brief-history-of-the-ftc-s-state-action-battles [https://perma.cc/VQD3-YAXG] (describing a
task force created in 2001 by Republican FTC Chair Tim Muris, which had a mandate to study
Parker immunity issues with an eye to bringing more pro-competition cases).
250. See Sunstein, supra note 241, at 874–83.
251. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).
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federal courts may lack the expertise and fact-finding processes to make
well-informed decisions over whether state regulatory decisions reflect exer-
cises of police power in the public interest, or, rather, naked pork-barreling
for the benefit of concentrated economic interests. On these scores, FTC
enforcement under Section 5 of the FTC Act enjoys a considerable advantage
over the Sherman Act.
First, Section 5 of the FTC Act is enforceable only by the FTC, not by
private plaintiffs.252 Superior preemption under Section 5 would not lead to
a flood of private challenges against state regulations, nor would it injure
state interests by forcing the states to constantly defend anti-regulatory ac-
tions by private interests. (Recall that Parker itself involved a private chal-
lenge to state law, as have many of the important state-action immunity
cases since).253 Rather, preemption of state law would depend on an admin-
istrative decision by a majority of the FTC commissioners to bring an action
or otherwise declare a state law preempted. Preemption would not flow di-
rectly from the statute, but from a decision of the FTC to enforce the statute
in a particular context. The burden of the intrusion on federalism interests
and state sovereignty would therefore be considerably lower than if the Sher-
man Act were read to directly preempt anticompetitive state laws, permitting
private plaintiffs to seek invalidation of state laws whenever the laws in-
fringed on competition.
Second, and relatedly, the FTC enjoys a much greater capacity to evalu-
ate the range of competing interests entailed by state regulations than does a
federal court. Not only does the commission employ a large staff of expert
economists,254 but it wields broad investigatory powers to investigate trade
conditions through mandatory processes such as document requests and
depositions.255 The FTC already serves the states in a consultative capacity,
giving advice on proposed legislation and engaging in competition advocacy
by issuing reports on various competition issues or intervening as amicus
curiae in litigation.256 Unlike generalist federal courts, the FTC has the ca-
pacity to study the competitive effects and justifications for state regulatory
252. Id. § 45(a)(2). While some states permit private suits under their own mini–FTC
Acts, such suits are limited to circumstances arising in each such state. Steven J. Cole, State
Enforcement Efforts Directed Against Unfair or Deceptive Practices, 56 Antitrust L.J. 125,
126–27 (1987).
253. See, e.g., City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991);
Cmty. Commc’ns. Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n
v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
254. The FTC’s Bureau of Economics employs approximately 80 full-time economists.
Bureau of Economics Biographies, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-
economics/biographies [https://perma.cc/8ZH3-GGBP].
255. 15 U.S.C. § 46 (2012).
256. Advocacy Filings, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/policy/advocacy/advocacy-filings [https://
perma.cc/49U4-N9UK] (“When government bodies and other organizations consider cases or
policy decisions that affect consumers or competition, the FTC may offer insight and expertise
to decision makers by filing an advocacy letter.”).
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schemes, consult formally or informally with state officials and other inter-
ested parties, and bring to bear its economic expertise in mediating compet-
ing claims about the effects of regulations on consumers or other interests.
In practice, the texture of federal preemption of anticompetitive state
laws would feel quite different if the FTC, rather than a federal court, were
the primary decisionmaker. With FTC preemption, challenges would be
fewer, built on a comprehensive pre-litigation record, and benefited by the
comparative advantage that the FTC enjoys over both state legislatures and
federal courts in economic and consumer-protection matters.
IV. FTC Enforcement in a World without Parker Constraints
This Article has developed an argument from legislative history, histori-
cal context, and institutional capacity for according the FTC a preemptive
capacity superior to the representation-reinforcement approach reflected in
the Sherman Act doctrine. The ultimate appeal of any such doctrinal shift
would depend significantly on what sort of preemptive role the commission
might play with respect to anticompetitive state regulation. The representa-
tion-reinforcement paradigm—insisting as it does on state political account-
ability, but not substantively scrutinizing the regulatory decision—exists on
a spectrum of possible modes of engagement between state and federal law.
Application of some of these modes to FTC superior preemption would in-
volve a considerably more drastic realignment of state and federal power and
a considerably greater aggrandizement of FTC powers than others.
Any plausible theory of superior preemption would need to avoid ren-
dering the FTC Act to condemn every state regulatory scheme that reduces
competition. As Frank Easterbrook has noted, regulation almost always dis-
places competition,257 but it would be manifestly infeasible—not to mention
fatal to the thesis of this Article—to hold the FTC Act preemptive of all
statutes with anticompetitive effects. Rather, superior preemption would
mean a firmer preemptive hand than the current Midcal representation-re-
inforcement regime, but would still need to allow ample room for pursuit of
state regulatory interests other than pure consumer-welfare maximization—
the commonly assumed goal of the FTC Act.258 Otherwise, a wide variety of
longstanding state regulations designed to pursue legitimate social and eco-
nomic objectives could be in jeopardy.
The superior-preemption doctrine might develop in part along categori-
cal lines—such as by prohibiting the externalization of large costs on con-
sumers outside the relevant political jurisdiction or rejecting certain classes
of state regulation as categorically incompatible with federal antitrust law.
However, much of the work would probably be done on a case-specific basis
under some pre-established analytical framework. This final Part provides a
257. Easterbrook, supra note 248, at 189.
258. The FTC describes its mission as “protecting America’s consumers.” FTC, https://
www.ftc.gov/ [https://perma.cc/VSK9-AX7E].
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framing perspective on three possible analytical approaches a superior-pre-
emptive scheme might employ, independently or in some combination.
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis
The core of modern antitrust analysis—applicable in all but those cases
ruled by principles of categorical legality or illegality—is an open-ended bal-
ancing test known as the rule of reason.259 Rule-of-reason analysis ultimately
asks whether the restraint on competition is welfare-enhancing or welfare-
reducing.260 It is such a familiar default form of analysis for antitrust institu-
tions, that it would seem a reflexive reference point for an enhanced pre-
emption regime. Rule-of-reason analysis is also a form of the cost-benefit
analysis familiar from regulatory review of administrative agency deci-
sions.261 One plausible instantiation of superior preemption would be for the
FTC to conduct an OIRA-like cost-benefit review of state laws displacing
competition.262 Laws would be preempted if their anticompetitive effects
outweighed any legitimate state regulatory purposes.
Despite the appeal of some cost-benefit review of state laws suppressing
competition, a full rule-of-reason-type approach for FTC superior preemp-
tion is fraught with risk. The FTC is a competition and consumer agency—it
excels at analyzing the benefits and harms to competition and consumers
from market behavior. But it has no comparative advantage or political le-
gitimacy to measure or balance other kinds of state interests, such as the
state’s revenue-raising, social and moral, or health, hygiene, and safety
interests.
Consider, for example, whether a state law restricting direct shipments
of wine to consumers could pass rule-of-reason analysis.263 The FTC would
have little difficulty in concluding, as it has already done, that such laws
reduce competition and increase prices to consumers.264 But how would the
commission assess a state’s countervailing interests in controlling access to
wine by minors, or limiting the sale of wine to licensed retail outlets, which
could be more effectively monitored by the state? Or what if a state made a
deliberate regulatory decision to suppress competition for wine distribution
259. 7 Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 94, ¶ 1502.
260. See id.
261. See Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position,
68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 323, 323–24 (2001) (describing the widespread use of cost-benefit analysis
in the modern administrative state).
262. See Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1355, 1361–62 (2009) (describing the historic centralization of cost-benefit analysis in the
Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs).
263. See, e.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 493 (2005) (invalidating on constitutional
grounds a Michigan statute prohibiting out-of-state direct wine shipments, but permitting in-
state shipments).
264. FTC, Possible Anticompetitive Barriers to E–Commerce: Wine 5–7 (2003),
http:// www.ftc.gov/ sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-report-con-
cerning-possible-anticompetitive-barriers-e-commerce-wine/winereport2.pdf [https://perma
.cc/67SV-A5QP].
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in order to effectively impose a Pigovian tax, and thereby decrease wine con-
sumption for sumptuary reasons? Antitrust courts have long resisted al-
lowing “non-economic” justifications of these kinds to enter rule-of-reason
analysis because they are not compatible with the sorts of economic-effi-
ciency assumptions in which antitrust institutions trade.265
To be sure, circumstances could arise where a preemption analysis
might soundly turn on cost-benefit analysis—particularly where the state
statute was directly and uniquely concerned with competitive regulation,
and, therefore, squarely within the zone of the FTC’s expertise. As a general
working principle, however, cost-benefit analysis seems a poor candidate for
FTC superior preemption.
B. Heightened Means-Ends Rationality
A second potential model of superior-preemptive FTC review might in-
volve something akin to heightened constitutional scrutiny—whether “inter-
mediate” or “strict”—of state regulations that substantially burden
competition. These familiar forms of means-ends rationality analysis—used,
for example, with respect to content-neutral speech restrictions and gender
classifications—typically require the challenged state regulation to satisfy a
two-part test: (1) that the state action serves some compelling or at least
important state interest; and (2) that it is narrowly tailored to meet the
state’s interest.266 Such tests can be phrased in varying degrees of strictness
(i.e., “compelling” or merely “important”), reflecting the degree of scrutiny
the judiciary will impose on the state action.267
Translating this test into the competition context, the FTC might review
state regulations that significantly burden competition by asking whether the
restraint is justified by an important sovereign function of the state. If it is
supported by a sovereign interest, the commission would then ask whether
the restraint is overbroad in meeting the state’s interest. Such an exercise
would resemble versions of the rule of reason suggested by some courts and
commentators, where a privately imposed anticompetitive restraint should
be upheld so long as it serves some legitimate procompetitive interest and is
reasonably well tailored to that end—without balancing the procompetitive
265. See Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 1171,
1226–28 (2016).
266. Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 566–67
(5th ed. 2015). Means-ends tests are ubiquitous in constitutional analysis. The EU’s means-
ends test is often called a “proportionality” test, consistent with the general principle of pro-
portionality in EU jurisprudence. Damien Chalmers et al., European Union Law 367–70
(2d ed. 2010).
267. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (stating that a compelling
interest is required for racial classification), with Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180,
189–90 (1997) (stating that content-neutral speech restrictions must serve an important state
interest).
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and anticompetitive effects.268 Compared to open-ended cost-benefit analy-
sis, such an inquiry would be less intrusive of state sovereignty and less
prone to moving the FTC beyond its zone of comparative institutional
advantage.
Outside the United States, there are precedents for such an analytical
framework in which an agency reviews anticompetitive state regulations.
Under current European Union law, the European Commission is directed
to answer the questions that Parker and its progeny have directed courts to
eschew: Whether member state action is justified by substantive policy con-
siderations under a mean-ends rationality framework?269 For example, in the
Italian Legal Fee Regulation cases,270 decided under Article 49 of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community (the former version of Article 56 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)), the Euro-
pean Court of Justice noted that restrictions on competition that produce
anticompetitive effects may sometimes be justified given a sufficiently im-
portant state interest and a reasonable relationship between the restriction
and the state’s important goal.271 Similarly, in the Slovakian Hybrid Mail
case,272 which involved comparable analysis under the TFEU’s competition
principles, the European Commission held that the Slovak Republic’s exten-
sion of its postal monopoly to hybrid mail (mail electronically transmitted
to a service provider and printed, put into an envelope, and delivered by the
provider) conflicted with Article 86(1) and 82’s requirement that member
states comply with EU competition rules.273 The commission required an
268. See C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116 Colum. L.
Rev. 927 (2016).
269. Some of these cases arise under Article 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU), which prohibits unjustified restrictions on the provision of cross-
border services. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 56, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 70 (formerly EC Treaty art. 49); see, e.g., Case C-212/
08, Zeturf Ltd. v. Premier Ministre, 2011 E.C.R. I-5636, I-5657 (holding under Article 49 that
“national legislation [creating gambling restrictions] is appropriate for ensuring attainment of
the objective pursued”—combating criminal and fraudulent activities and protecting soci-
ety—“only if it genuinely reflects a concern to attain it in a consistent and systematic man-
ner”); Joined Cases C-94/04 & C-202/04, Cipolla v. Fazari, 2006 E.C.R. I-11455, I-11478
(ruling that an Italian statutory scale for lawyers’ fees “constitute[d] a restriction on freedom
to provide services laid down in Article 49 EC”). Others, like the Slovakian Hybrid Mail Case,
see infra note 272 and accompanying text, arise under Article 106(2) and Article 102, which
directly cover competition law.
270. Cipolla, 2006 E.C.R. I-11455.
271. Cipolla, 2006 E.C.R. at I-11475 (“In that respect, it must be pointed out that, first,
the protection of consumers, in particular recipients of the legal services provided by persons
concerned in the administration of justice and, secondly, the safeguarding of the proper ad-
ministration of justice, are objectives to be included among those which may be regarded as
overriding requirements relating to the public interest capable of justifying a restriction on
freedom to provide services . . . on condition, first, that the national measure at issue in the
main proceedings is suitable for securing the attainment of the objective pursued and, sec-
ondly, it does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain that objective.”).
272. Commission Decision, 2008 O.J. (C 322) (EC).
273. Id. at 31.
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“objective justification” for anticompetitive regulatory restraints, meaning a
tight relationship between the regulatory scheme and the state’s legitimate
interests.274 After thoroughly scrutinizing the factual record and Slovakia’s
asserted justifications, the commission failed to find the required means-
ends fit, and thus determined that the hybrid-mail monopoly was pre-
empted by EU competition principles.275
The strictness of means-ends rationality tests can vary dramatically ac-
cording to context. A superior-preemptive FTC jurisprudence based on
means-ends rationality would need to develop with attention to the particu-
lars of federalism and the FTC’s comparative advantages. One potentially
salutary function of FTC review might be critical evaluation of the economic
theories and empirical claims used to justify state regulations. For example, a
state’s claim that prohibiting oil companies to own gasoline retailers (a “di-
vorcement” law) is necessary to securing retail competition, and, hence,
lower prices to consumers, might be answered by the FTC’s economic exper-
tise on vertical integration in the oil industry.276 The restraint might fail
means-ends review, because the economic theory purportedly adopted by
the state was not grounded in sound economic evidence or theory.
C. Hard Look Review
A third potential approach to superior preemption—hard look re-
view—would take its cues from administrative law and reflect a middle
ground between full substantive review (i.e., cost-benefit analysis) and the
political-process-focused orientation of the current Parker doctrine. The
spirit of hard look review is to insist that agencies engage in thorough, rea-
soned decisionmaking without involving the courts in displacing the agen-
cies’ technical and political judgments with their own.277 Hard look review
involves a high degree of judicial engagement with regulatory decisions, but
also a more restrained role for judicial review than characterizes the sort of
substantive, balancing review described previously.278
The expression “hard look” describes two different features of the inter-
action between courts and agencies. First, the doctrine requires agencies to
take a “hard look” at the regulatory question, considering all relevant data,
274. Id. at 23 (quoting Notice from the Commission, 1998 O.J. (C 39) (EC) 2).
275. Id. at 31.
276. See, e.g., Letter from Ronald B. Rowe, Dir. for Litig., FTC, to the Hon. Alan A.
Diamonstein, Chairman, Gen. Laws Comm., House of Delegates, Commonwealth of Va. (Mar.
2, 1990), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-com
ment-hon.alan.diamonstein-concerning-virginia-s.b.235-prohibit-petroleum-refiners-owning-
and-operating-retail-motor-fuel-stations/v900012.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5RN-5YRP] (offer-
ing an opinion on the FTC’s expertise with anticompetitive effects of divorcement laws).
277. Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851–52 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Judge
Leventhal, one of the hard look doctrine’s most distinguished expositors, described the doc-
trine as combining “judicial supervision with a salutary principle of judicial restraint.” Harold
Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 509,
511–12 (1974) (quoting Greater Bos., 444 F.2d at 851).
278. See Leventhal, supra note 277, at 540–41.
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alternatives, and public comments. Second, courts take their own “hard
look” at the regulatory decision to ensure that the agency’s decision was
sufficiently deliberate.279 The result is an iterative interaction between courts
and regulators in which courts have halt-enforcement of an agency decision
until the regulator takes a harder look at the problem, or in which they
ultimately vacate the regulatory decision altogether.280
Translated into the context of FTC superior preemption, hard look re-
view would mean extensive FTC engagement with state legislatures and reg-
ulatory agencies over regulations significantly burdening competition.
Because hard look review, as an administrative law concept, relates to the
relationship between a court and an administrative agency, it could not be
transposed directly to the FTC–state law context, given the many structural
differences in the relationship between the FTC and state legislatures or reg-
ulatory bodies. Nonetheless, the most significant features of hard look re-
view might prove useful in the superior preemption context.
The most general and important feature of hard look review is its insis-
tence that regulators explain their regulatory decisions in a thorough and
reasoned fashion, with reference to factual predicates available in a public
record.281 Courts invalidate agency action when the agency fails to explain
itself through logically consistent reasoning, with reference to verifiable pub-
lic facts.282 The requirement of reasoned decisionmaking on a public record
can be justified as a mechanism for ensuring that regulators act for public-
interested reasons, and not merely to patronize narrow special interests.
When a regulator’s true motivation is economic parochialism, the require-
ment that it justify its actions on public interest grounds may force the
agency to come up with implausible, contradictory, or empirically unsup-
ported justifications, in which event, a court may invalidate the agency
action.283
Application of such a reasoned-decision/public-record requirement to
instances of state action burdening competition could be valuable.284 At a
279. See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 505,
525–44 (1985).
280. Cf. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 56–57
(1983) (overturning an agency regulation as arbitrary and capricious).
281. See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Re-
view, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 753, 761–63 (2006).
282. See, e.g., id. at 761.
283. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L.
Rev. 1667, 1758 (1975) (“[T]he requirement that agencies give adequate consideration to all
affected interests, and in particular, the interests of the intended beneficiaries of an adminis-
trative scheme, has been utilized by the courts with increasing frequency to redress perceived
agency favoritism to organized interests.”); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in
Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 Yale L.J. 2, 34–35 (2009) (“Hard look review was one of
the main tools that the courts developed to ensure that agencies were looking at the statute
and the evidence and were choosing answers that served the public good.”).
284. In some contexts, courts predicate the constitutionality of legislation on the suffi-
ciency of legislative findings regarding predicate facts. See Daniel A. Crane, Enacted Legislative
Findings and the Deference Problem, 102 Geo. L.J. 637 (2014).
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high level of generality, the state-action problem concerns the difficulty of
determining when a regulation that limits competition is necessary to
achieve the interests of the general public, as opposed to when it merely
represents regulatory capture and rent-seeking behavior by the regulated en-
tities. Hard look review could serve as an information-forcing device, re-
quiring the regulating state to reveal to the FTC, if not its actual cards, at
least a hand capable of rationally supporting the anticompetitive regulatory
decision.285 Since it would usually be politically unpalatable for states to jus-
tify anticompetitive regulations purely as bestowing economic rents on fa-
vored groups of producers,286 the reasoned-decision/public-record
requirement could erect a barrier to anticompetitive state action that does
not have some plausible public interest explanation.
A second facet of hard look review is a requirement that agencies give
explicit consideration to alternatives to the regulatory decision taken.287 The
consideration-of-alternatives requirement serves some of the same purposes
as the narrow tailoring, or “least restrictive alternative,” analysis discussed
previously, but with the important difference that the reviewing body does
not strike down a regulation just because it fails to achieve the regulatory
objective in the most efficient, or least restrictive, way. Rather, the consider-
ation-of-alternatives requirement merely forces the regulator to explain why
obvious alternatives were inferior to the chosen solution. This ensures that
the regulatory authority seriously considers alternative solutions, and that its
reasoned justification for the chosen solution can be evaluated in compari-
son to other options. Analytical or factual flaws in the agency’s explanation
for the rejection of alternatives can themselves lead to judicial invalidation of
the agency’s action.
In the competition context, application of the consideration-of-alterna-
tives requirement by the FTC could prompt state regulators to consider reg-
ulatory approaches that create fewer barriers to competition. In particular,
where a state substitutes centralized planning for market-based determina-
tions of production and distribution, the FTC could ensure that that the
state articulates reasons why market-based solutions were inadequate to
meet the regulatory objective.288 This, in turn, would require the state to
285. Stephenson, supra note 281, at 755 (discussing hard look review as an information-
forcing device).
286. As noted earlier, such naked economic protectionism may run afoul of constitutional
equal protection principles. See supra text accompanying notes 7–10.
287. The leading case on the consideration-of-alternatives requirement is Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43,
50–51 (1983), in which the Supreme Court required the Department of Transportation to
consider technological alternatives to its proposed automobile safety regulations concerning
seatbelts and airbags.
288. For example, U.S. Presidential Executive Order 12866, issued in 1993 by President
Clinton and continuing in force today, requires agencies to “identify and assess available alter-
natives to direct regulation, including providing economic incentives to encourage the desired
behavior, such as user fees or marketable permits, or providing information upon which
choices can be made by the public.” Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(b)(3), 3 C.F.R. 638, 639
(Sept. 30, 1993).
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explain not merely the market failures that prompted the regulatory deci-
sion, but also why those failures could not be corrected through less-intru-
sive regulatory actions.
A final important feature of hard look review is the requirement that
any justifications for the regulatory decision be presented at the time of the
regulatory decision, and not subsequently invented for litigation purposes.289
The contemporaneousness rule stands in contrast to rational basis review,
under which a regulatory action is upheld if it could be supported by any
conceivable rational basis. Not only must the regulatory decision be empiri-
cally supported, as opposed to merely rational, but the agency must think
through the justifications upon which it will rely before promulgating the
regulation. The basis for the regulation should be decided by the state actors
making the regulatory decision, not by lawyers subsequently brought in to
defend it.
In the competition context, the contemporaneousness requirement
could increase the likelihood that state legislatures or regulatory bodies con-
sult with economic or technological experts when framing statutes or regu-
lations that impair competition. It would diminish the likelihood that states
would act solely to insulate special interests from competition and then rely
on legal arguments to defeat challenges to the anticompetitive regulatory
decision. It would also diminish the likelihood that states would rely on
theoretical or potential, rather than documented, market failures to justify
measures that suppress competition. In short, the contemporaneousness re-
quirement could prompt states to take a more careful look at the competi-
tive effects of their decisions before taking actions that reduce market
competitiveness, knowing that a failure to do so could lead to preemption by
federal antitrust law.
The FTC might exercise its superior-preemptive authority to bolster the
accountability of state legislatures and regulators when they regulate in an-
ticompetitive ways. By developing a reputation for declaring anticompetitive
state laws preempted unless based on a contemporaneously reasoned public
record, with due consideration of market-based alternatives, the commission
might provide a backstop to the worst abuses of special interest group legis-
lation and regulation.
Conclusion
In over a century of resolving appeals from FTC decisions, the Supreme
Court has never decided whether the Parker doctrine applies wholesale to
the FTC, or whether the commission enjoys superior-preemptive authority
over anticompetitive state laws. The absence of agitation for a decision on
the issue, and the FTC’s guarded acquiescence in submitting to the Parker
doctrine, is, itself, revealing. The courts may be wary of an imperialistic FTC
289. In administrative law, this is known as the “Chenery doctrine.” See SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943) (holding that the validity of agency discretionary action must
rise or fall based on the validity of the agency’s contemporaneous explanation for its decision).
December 2016] State-Action Immunity and Section 5 of the FTC Act 411
upsetting the delicate equilibrium of federalism, and the FTC itself may be
concerned about the political and institutional repercussions of wielding a
broad preemptive power.
Nonetheless, in recent years, the commission appears to be chafing at
the bit: it has reacted to a new set of state regulations suppressing competi-
tion in the new economy; and it has felt the need to reclaim some function
for Section 5 of the FTC Act and a distinctive institutional role on competi-
tion matters. Superior preemption would scratch both of these itches—giv-
ing the commission both an enhanced tool to promote competition and
innovation in the new economy, and an avenue to find a distinctive function
for Section 5.
This Article has focused heavily on the legislative history and context of
the FTC Act, since the Supreme Court gave the same weight to the Sherman
Act’s history and context in Parker. It has also focused on the ghosts of
Lochner in Parker, since that is how subsequent courts and commentators
have understood the Court’s concealed motivation in Parker and its progeny.
Looking forward, however, the appeal of according the FTC superior-pre-
emptive authority depends most importantly on articulating the affirmative
institutional case based on the commission’s expertise, resources, and con-
straints, and in specifying the mode of analysis the commission would em-
ploy in reviewing anticompetitive state regulations.
